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Abstract
During the housing bust of 2008–2009, housing prices and transaction volumes fell across
the United Kingdom. While the drop in prices was similar across housing types, transaction
volumes fell more for units at the lower end of the market. I document this fact and provide
panel and instrumental variable estimates showing its link with tightening credit conditions in
England and Wales during 2008. I then use an overlapping-generations framework to relate
the change in the composition of sales with the reduction in loan-to-value ratios by British
banks and to derive additional predictions. As down-payment requirements increase, young
households with scarce financial resources are priced out by older owners who retain their
previous houses as rental properties when trading up. Recent changes in aggregate housing
tenure, disaggregated changes in renting, and sales in areas with different age compositions,
are consistent with these predictions. The results presented here show how the composition
of sales changes over the housing cycle and may inform ongoing policy discussions about
reduced access to home-ownership by the young.
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1. Introduction
House prices and transaction volumes fall during recessions and rise during expansions.1 This
paper begins by showing that these changes feature a previously overlooked heterogeneity across
different quality segments of the housing market. During the housing bust of 2008–2009, housing
prices and transaction volumes fell across the entire United Kingdom. While the initial reduction
in prices was similar across housing types, transaction volumes fell more for houses at the lower
end of the market. To document this, I use an administrative dataset containing all private housing
market transactions in England and Wales. Figure 1 illustrates the finding. The left panel plots the
median percentage change in prices between 2007 and 2009 against a measure of housing quality.
We see that the relationship is slightly positive but close to flat. The right panel shows the same
plot for the percentage change in transactions, where we see that the drop in sales was substantially
larger for lower-quality houses. This differential decrease in transactions affected the composition
of sales in subsequent years.
In this paper I show that these changes are the result of the tightening of credit conditions
in the United Kingdom during 2008, which lead to a sharp reduction of the Loan-to-Value ratios
(LTVs) on mortgages offered by British banks to First-time Buyers (FTBs). I use city-level data on
changes in LTVs to estimate the effect of this tightening of credit conditions on transaction volumes
and prices across segments of the housing market. My findings indicate that a 1 percentage point
reduction in mean Loan-to-Value ratios reduced transactions of average quality housing by up to
1.2%. However, for housing with quality a standard deviation below the mean, the same change
in LTVs generated a reduction of 3% in volumes. This heterogeneous effect is consistent with the
changing composition of sales after 2008.
1Evidence of time series correlation between sale volumes and prices is presented in Berkovec and Goodman (1996),
Lamont and Stein (1999) for the United States and Andrew and Meen (2003), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2004), Benito
(2006) for the United Kingdom.
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Notes: Left: The vertical axis represents the proportional change in prices between 2007 and 2009 and
the horizontal axis measures within-city quality rank calculated as shown in section 3. The line represents
a polynomial fitted using a median regression of changes in prices on the quality rank (correlation equal
to 4%). Right: The vertical axis represents the change in transactions between 2007 and 2009 and the
horizontal axis measures within-city quality ranks. The line represents a polynomial fitted using a median
regression of changes in transactions on the quality rank (correlation equal to 19%).
In order to explore the mechanisms in operation behind this finding and to derive additional
implications, I propose a tractable housing ladder model with borrowing constraints and renting
in which credit conditions affect the composition of sales. In the model, greater down-payment
requirements hinder house purchases by young households with lower levels of wealth. In turn,
older and wealthier households facing lower prices become ‘accidental landlords’, who keep their
previous properties and rent them out when moving up the housing ladder. The fact that these
entry-level houses are rented instead of being sold drives the change in the composition of trans-
actions: sales of lower quality houses make up a smaller fraction of the total when down-payment
requirements increase. In addition to reproducing the stylized fact outlined above, the model deliv-
ers additional predictions that are tested empirically: tighter credit leads to an increase in private
renting, a negative cross-sectional correlation between renting and transactions, and less purchases
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by the young. I exploit the high level of geographical disaggregation in my transactions dataset to
test these implication and find support for the underlying mechanism.
The last decade has seen a consistent reduction in home-ownership rates for young households
in the United Kingdom. While these households still aspire to become owners, high prices and
deposit constraints stand in the way of these aspirations. By examining the evolution of transactions
in different segments of the housing market, this paper sheds light on the mechanism leading to this
change by tying the composition of sales, credit conditions and the supply of rented housing. In
doing so, I also provide a mechanism that explains why young generations in England and Wales
have been priced out of owner-occupation after 2008.
This study contributes to the empirical literature studying the heterogeneity of housing cycles
across different market segments. Previous studies have documented how the prices for housing of
different quality change over the cycle, particularly during boom periods such as the early 2000s
in the United States.2 For example, several studies seek to explain within-city changes in prices
during the housing boom (e.g. Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), Glaeser, Gottlieb and Tobio (2012),
Genesove and Han (2013) and Guerrieri, Hartley and Hurst (2013)). In recent work, Landvoigt,
Piazzesi and Schneider (2015) focus on matching the joint distributions of wealth, income and
qualities using an assignment model which takes the quality distribution of traded units as given.
Relative to this literature, my paper focuses specifically on understanding and explaining changes in
the composition of transactions. Incorporating transactions into the analysis is relevant because, in
the recent UK housing bust, the disparity between segments is larger in the evolution of transaction
volumes than in the evolution of prices.
My contribution is also related to the empirical and theoretical literatures on the effects of credit
constraints on housing prices and transaction volumes. Stein (1995) presents a partial equilibrium
2There are some exceptions. Smith and Tesarek (1991) study the evolution of housing prices across qualities during
a Houston boom-bust episode in the 80s. Case and Mayer (1996) study cross-sectional differences in the evolution of
prices over time and relate them to changes in supply and demand factors.
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model linking down-payment requirements to the number of sales. Its mechanism is integrated
into a housing model with endogenous prices in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1999) and Ortalo-Magne
and Rady (2006). In these studies the change in the time series for transactions emerges from
capital gains (or losses) on starter homes. I propose an alternative mechanism relating borrowing
constraints and sales by emphasizing the link between housing ladder transitions and the supply
of housing in the rental market. In this sense, I draw attention to the relationship between the
composition of sales and changes in home-ownership rates. Moreover, the qualitative predictions
from my model refer to the variation in the impact of borrowing constraints on sale volumes across
housing types rather than on the time series of total transactions.3
Recent work has documented the effect of credit supply shocks on residential and other markets.
Mian and Sufi (2009) use spatially disaggregated credit demand measures to study the effect of a
credit expansion on the growth in housing prices during the boom and defaults during the bust.
Mondragon (2017) and Kleiner (2015) use different methods to identify how lender level shocks
can impact the housing, credit and labour markets. My contribution to this literature is to focus
specifically on the impact of changing credit conditions on different segments of the housing market,
tenure choice and the composition of sales.
Finally, this paper informs the literature on house price indices. It is broadly acknowledged that
changes in composition must be taken into account when constructing housing price indices (see
for example Case (1986) and Case and Shiller (1989), see also Hill (2012) for a survey). Gatzlaff
and Haurin (1997) argue that traditional hedonic or repeat sales methods which use characteristics
to adjust for changes in composition may still face selection problems which yield biased measures
of the price of the housing stock at any point in time. Kleiner (2014) documents a change in
composition in the United States in the period between 2000 and 2006 and provides a method to
3Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009) propose a quantitative model with heterogeneous housing types and
renting to understand the effect of mortgage markets innovations on US home-ownership rates. Their analysis does not
focus on studying the composition of sales or the dynamics of transactions.
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construct a repeat-sales price index which is robust to these changes. Despite the variety of methods
available to deal with changes in composition, little is known about how and why the composition
of transactions actually changes over the cycle. This paper describes these changes and provides
evidence relating them to credit conditions. The documented change in the composition of sales
after 2008 implies that mean prices undervalue the extent of the housing slump relative to quality-
adjusted indices.
The data used in the empirical sections of this paper is presented in section 2. To measure
transaction volumes and prices, I use the Price Paid Dataset from the English and Welsh Land Reg-
istry. This dataset covers all regular residential transactions in England and Wales. High coverage
is essential in order to study possible changes in transactions for different qualities over time.
In Section 3, I document how housing prices and transactions changed between 2007 and 2009
for different segments within English and Welsh metropolitan areas. To do so, I propose two dif-
ferent estimates of unobserved quality, both yielding similar results. Housing of different qualities
experienced a similar fall in prices. In contrast, transactions fell substantially more for lower quality
units, changing the composition of sales.
The findings are interpreted in the context of recent academic and policy discussions highlight-
ing the role of credit conditions in housing markets and their effect on young households. In section
4, I use data from a mortgage provider and exploit heterogeneity across cities in the change of
Loan-to-Value ratios to estimate the effect of credit tightening on the composition of sales. Panel
and instrumental variable estimates show that the reduction in LTVs to first-time buyers had a large
negative effect on transactions of low quality dwellings. I do not observe an heterogeneous effect
of changes in LTVs on prices.
Section 5 presents a housing ladder model with renting and credit constraints in which house-
holds differ in age and income. I use this to show that steady states with tighter lending conditions
have a lower number of first-time buyers, a right-shifted composition of traded qualities and higher
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levels of renting. In addition, tighter credit leads to more let-to-buy (households which keep their
starter houses and rent these when trading up). These results are driven by the pricing out of young
buyers by wealthier, older households when credit is tighter.
Evidence supporting the underlying mechanism is presented in Section 6. Using disaggregated
information on the evolution of housing tenure, I show a strong negative correlation between the
fall in transactions and the increase in renting. Using data on changes in LTV by city, I relate credit
tightening to changes in rental markets. Finally, I show that the change in transactions had a clear
age profile.
Other explanations which could also account for the change in composition of housing sales are
discussed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes by discussing policy implications and avenues
for further research.
2. Data
Throughout most of this paper I use the Land Registry’s Price Paid dataset covering the vast
majority of residential transactions in England and Wales.4 It includes market transactions for the
1995-2013 period recording the transaction price, address, an indicator of dwelling type (detached,
semi-detached, terrace or flat), contract type (freehold or leasehold) and whether the house is a new
build.
The Price Paid data for the 1995-2013 period includes a total of 18,744,353 transactions. Given
that leasehold transactions do not include information on the lease term I exclude them from the
analysis. I also exclude new build sales as they are related to construction activity. As will be
shown below, neither of these restrictions have a qualitative effect on my findings. Finally, I drop
all transactions missing location data. These sample restrictions are summarized in Table A1 in
4The Price Paid dataset excludes properties which are likely to be sold at a discount either because they are transfers
or conveyances (e.g. transfers under court order, sale of shares of a property), leases under 7 years of their expiry date,
transfers of more than one property as part of a portfolio or right-to buy properties. These transactions amount to roughly
an 80% of the total transactions reported by HM Revenue & Customs.
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Appendix A. The final transactions dataset encompasses a total of 12,537,180 transactions for the
1995-2013. I also build a repeat-sales sample of units sold at least twice over my sample period.
There are a total of 9.4342.390 transactions in my repeat-sales dataset.
I complement this with information from other sources. Disaggregated population counts by
age group are obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). Data on labour market per-
formance is obtained from the Annual Population Survey and the Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings.5 Disaggregated data on housing tenure distributions is taken from the 2001 and 2011
census, while aggregate tenure is obtained from the English Housing Survey. Internal migration
data is obtained from the ONS. With respect to information on credit market conditions, I use data
on mortgages granted by Nationwide - one of the largest mortgage providers in the United Kingdom
- to measure LTV ratios to first time buyers in 1999, 2007 and 2009. Figures A8 and A7, in Ap-
pendix A, show that this dataset is broadly representative of the spatial distribution of transactions
and the trends in lending behaviour over the 2007 to 2009 period.
Geographies
Throughout the paper I use data at different levels of geographical disaggregation. Aggregate
quantities refer to England and Wales only. My definition of spatial housing markets or cities
is based on Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWAs). TTWAs are analogous to commuting zones for the
United States and are built using information on commuting patterns. There are a total of 186
travel-to-work areas in England and Wales. Throughout the paper I use the terms city and TTWA
interchangeably.
Within-TTWAs I use information at the lower super output area (LSOA), postcode sector and
postcode district levels. LSOAs are spatial units defined for the collection and publication of data
by the ONS. They represent the smallest area at which the 2011 census data was disclosed. There
5Information on labour markets is usually available at the local authority level. In the small minority of cases in which
local authority data is not available I impute the corresponding regional figure (20/300 cases for unemployment).
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Figure 2: Evolution of Transactions and Prices
Note: Data for England and Wales. Left vertical axis corresponds to transaction volumes and right vertical axis cor-
responds to prices. Number of transactions in thousands. The price index is the repeat-sales index built by the Land
Registry (base set to June 2003).
are 34,753 LSOAs in England and Wales, of which 34,374 have at least one transaction in the Land
Registry dataset. Postcode sectors (PS) and postcode districts are aggregations of postcodes.6
I use the National Statistics Postcode Lookup Directory (PLD) to match this geographical infor-
mation with the Land Registry dataset. The PLD links postcodes with all the relevant geographies
in the UK.
The Housing Market of England and Wales
Figure 2 shows the series of de-seasonalized housing transactions and prices for the 1995-2013
period. Before the financial crisis, the monthly number of sales increased from around 70,000 in
1995 to 100,000 after 1998 and then oscillated around this figure until the last quarter of 2007.
After a brief period of stagnation house prices began to drop steadily and by April 2009 the Land
Registry’s index reached its trough.7 This supposed a 17% drop in nominal housing prices (20.4%
6On average a postcode sector contains 2,995 households housing 7,272 people. There are 8,464 PS with at least one
transaction in the Land Registry dataset. Postcode districts are aggregations of postcode sectors. There are roughly 2,900
postcode districts in the UK and 2,345 postcode districts with positive sales in my Land Registry dataset.
7The previous housing downturn in the United Kingdom had taken place in the late 80s when rising mortgage rates
and a worsening of labour market conditions affected affordability in UK housing markets (Jowsey (2011)).
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in real terms). Simultaneously, 2008 saw a fast decrease in transaction volumes: December 2008
recorded 51% less housing purchases than the same month in 2007. The change in transactions
was coupled with a sharp decrease in listings during 2008 and an increase in time on the market
for listed houses (see Figure A1 in Appendix A) . More than six years after the bust started, prices
and transactions had not fully recovered. In 2013, yearly sales were still lower than in every year
between 1997 and 2007.
Regarding trends in housing tenure, the 1981-2001 period saw an increase in home-ownership
from 59% to 69%. Several studies point to the relaxation of credit conditions over the 80s and 90s,
as the source of this change in tenure (see Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), Ortalo-Magne and Rady
(1999), Stephens, Whitehead and Munro (2005)). However, in 2001 the rate of home-ownership
started to decrease and private renting recovered. Between 2002 and 2008, the percentage of house-
holds living as renters increased from 10% to 12.8% , mainly through increases in rented stock
resulting from purchases by home-owners for investment purposes. Renting increased faster during
the crisis, going from 12.8% to 16.4% in 2012. Rented units usually have lower selling prices than
owner-occupied units. This owes in large part to differences in physical characteristics, as reported
in Halket, Nesheim and Oswald (2015) and shown in Figure A2 in Appendix A.
3. Stylised Fact: The Bust by Housing Qualities
In this section I study how the downturn affected different segments of the housing market. In
particular, I study how prices and transactions fell between 2007 and 2009 for houses of different
quality levels.
In order to study how transactions and prices of different qualities evolved during the crisis
I first need a definition of quality that can be applied to my transaction data. I will define the
quality of a house as a fixed, unobservable attribute which is desirable for households seeking to
reside there and, hence, will be positively correlated with prices in equilibrium. Note that I am not
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seeking to estimate quality as a structural parameter in household preferences but rather to obtain a
classification of houses in terms of this unobservable trait.
For this purpose, suppose the price for a unit i sold in quarter t can be decomposed as follows:
pit = δ
TTWA
it + αi + ξit.
Where pit is the logarithm of the transaction price and δ
TTWA
t is a set of (TTWA specific) time
dummies. The error term ξit captures random variation in the transaction price that is not fixed
or unit specific (e.g.: specific to the buyer-seller match). Quality is defined as αi and is fixed and
unobservable. In the estimation of quality, I will only use data from the benchmark (1997-2007)
period.8 The challenge is to obtain an estimate for this parameter. For this purpose I follow two
methods, both of them inspired in the house price index literature. The first follows a hedonic
approach, estimating quality using location - housing type groups. The second uses repeated sales
of the same unit (matched using address).
3.1. House Groups
I first use data on type of dwelling (detached, semi-detached, terrace, flat) and location to group
houses and then takes mean prices within these groups as proxies for αi. In using this information
I follow the spirit of hedonic or spatial house price indices which control for unit characteristics to
eliminate changes in the composition of sales (see Hill (2012) for a survey).
Formally, the method proceeds by estimating the following specification by OLS:
pit = δ
TTWA
it + µj + ξit.
Again pit corresponds to the log of price for house i sold at quarter t. Parameter µj is a dummy
for location or location-type group j, δTTWAit is a set of city specific time effects, and ξit is an error
term. The set of city-by-quarter dummies in δTTWAit filters out city-wide variation in prices. The
8The period used in the estimation of quality does not affect the qualitative results.
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set of dummies µj captures price variation between dwellings within cities. Location and dwelling
types are important determinants of housing prices and explain a large fraction (over 70%) of their
cross-sectional variance. Moreover, location-dwelling type groups have stable price rankings within
each TTWA. Both of these conditions make them reasonable proxies for αi. I use µ̂j as proxies for
quality in each group j.
As an initial illustration, I focus on the case of the London TTWA and group houses by postcode
district. There are roughly 270 postcode districts in this metropolitan area and fixed effects at this
level explain 77% of the cross-sectional variance in log prices. Once I estimate µ̂j, I assign postcode
districts into estimated quality quintiles. I then compare these quality quantiles to the change in
transactions and house prices at the postcode district level. In both cases the change is taken over
the 2007 and 2009 periods.
I illustrate the results in the map shown in Figure 3. The upper panel displays a map of London’s
postcode districts in which darker shades correspond to higher quality (more expensive) areas. We
observe that central London and the South West are high quality areas whereas the East is cheaper.
In the middle panel I portray the change in transactions in each district with darker shades corre-
sponding to larger decreases in the number of sales between 2009 and 2007. Finally, the bottom
panel displays the change in prices for each area with darker shades corresponding to larger de-
clines.
The comparison between these maps is illustrative of the stylized fact documented in this paper.
Comparing the top and middle panels we can observe that places with higher quality experienced
more moderate reductions in transactions. Take, for example, the case of central London and the
South West. In both cases we observe a corridor of high quality areas with some of the smallest
declines in transaction volumes. The opposite happens in the more affordable areas in East London,
which experienced a sharper reduction in sales. The picture for prices is less clear. In the third panel,
we observe that several districts in the South West rank high in the distribution of price reductions.
11
Figure 3: Postcode Districts in London TTWA
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The correlation between price drops and low quality is only clear in the east and less so than in the
case of transactions.
I now turn to a detailed analysis, combining more disaggregated location data with information
on dwelling types in my estimation of quality and extending the analysis beyond London. For this
purpose I define groups at the postcode sector - dwelling type level. A postcode sector dwelling-type
group identifies a type of house in a specific location.9 A total of 36,085 postcode sector - dwelling
type (PS-DT) groups had at least one sale during the benchmark (1997-2007) period. I now re-
estimate the price equation above using this definition of groups. Parameter µj now corresponds to
a PS-DT dummy for group j.
I obtain µ̂j as proxies for quality in each group. For all PS-DT pairs having positive sales in 2007
and 2009, I compute the percent difference in mean prices between peak (2007) and trough (2009)
as well as the difference in average yearly transactions between both years. Figure 4 plots these
differences against the within-TTWA rank of estimated quality. The figure represents contours
for a kernel density estimated over the underlying scatter plot of housing groups. Contour lines
correspond to different quantiles of the estimated density.
The change in prices is shown in the top panel. We can see it was on average negative, as
expected, and that it was fairly homogeneous across qualities. The correlation on the kernel density
estimate appears close to 0 or slightly positive.10 Turning to transactions, the bottom panel of
Figure 4 displays a clear positive correlation: the percentage drop in transactions was lower for
houses higher up in the quality distribution with the correlation being roughly 17%. The pattern
is observed consistently in the vast majority of TTWAs including the 10 largest ones (not shown).
The fact that the number of transactions fell more for lower quality houses implies a change in
9For example: detached houses in postcode sector E1 4, semi-detached houses in postcode sector WC2A 2 or detached
houses in postcode sector CV4 7.
10In order to further explore this, I have divided houses into high and low quality by splitting them with respect to the
TTWA-specific median and estimate price indexes for each of these groups. After their peak in late 2007, prices fell for
both groups to their lowest level in 2009. The fall was not quite symmetric, the index for low units fell by 18% while the
one for high units fell by 16%. Still, the difference is rather modest and masks substantial heterogeneity between cities.
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Figure 4: Change in Prices and Transactions by Quality
Postcode Sector - Dwelling Type Pairs
Note: Top: plots the change in prices between 2007 and 2009 against the within-TTWA quality rank. Bottom: plots the
change in yearly transactions between the 2007 and 2009 periods against the within-TTWA quality rank. In both cases
the units are the postcode sector-dwelling type pairs with positive sales in both years. The figure plots the contour plot of
an Normal kernel density estimate with bandwidth chosen according to Silverman’s rule-of-thumb. Contour lines chosen
using quantiles of the density estimate.
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composition: the fraction of total transactions corresponding to these units was lower after 2008.
Alternatively, I estimate the change in prices and transactions for different location-type groups
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The dependent variables log(price)jt and log(transjt) correspond to the logarithms of the mean price
and the number of transactions for group j in year t, respectively. In both cases the variables are
normalized so that the relevant coefficient can be interpreted in terms of 2007 standard deviations
of the dependent variable. Variable d2009 is a dummy taking value 1 in 2009. The coefficients of
interest in this context are β
price
2
and βtrans2 which measure the respective changes in the slopes of
the quality-price and quality-transactions relationships.
Table 1: Stylized Fact - Quality Estimated by Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(price) log(price) log(trans) log(trans)
Quality 1.082*** 1.084*** -0.158*** -0.163***
(0.0322) (0.0339) (0.0148) (0.0199)
Quality ×d2009 0.00672** 0.00302 0.110*** 0.121***
(0.00318) (0.00581) (0.0267) (0.0111)
d2009 -0.0233*** -0.161***
(0.00353) (0.0187)
Observations 48,442 48,442 48,442 48,442
R-squared 0.910 0.911 0.079 0.082
TTWA Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTWA - Year Effects No Yes No Yes
Note: In column 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the standardized logarithm of mean prices. In columns 3 and 4 it is
the standardized number of transactions. In both cases the standardization amounts to subtracting the mean and dividing
by the standard deviation, both calculated within the TTWA. All columns estimated via OLS over the sample of location





and βtrans2 are presented in the second row of Table 1. We can see that in
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all cases the coefficients of interest are positive. The coefficient on the time effect d2009 in column
1 indicates that the price of a unit of average quality declined by a 2.3% of the cross sectional
standard deviation between 2007 and 2009. The coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the
decline in prices was only slightly larger for properties with quality a standard deviation below the
average (-(0.023+0.006)=2.9%). Including TTWA-year effects in column 2 makes the interaction
term indistinguishable from 0. In the case of transactions, we also find the coefficient on the time
dummy is negative and significant, (i.e. transactions dropped for units of average quality). But the
coefficient for the interaction term in column 3 indicates that properties with qualities one standard
deviation below the average experienced a 2/3 larger drop in transactions than properties of average
quality. Note that this result is robust to controlling for year-TTWA effects.
Hence, while there was only a small increase in the difference in prices between the lower and
higher ends of the market in 2009, the difference in transaction volumes between between segments
changed substantially. This is another expression of the stylized fact documented above. While the
fall in prices between 2007 and 2009 was fairly similar for units of different quality, transactions
fell much more in the lower end of the market.
3.2. Repeat-Sales
The second approach used to estimate housing qualities is inspired by the repeat-sales method
proposed initially by Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) and popularized after Case and Shiller (1989).
For this purpose, I focus on the sub-sample of units which had been sold at least twice between 1995
and 2013. Having more than one sale allows me to estimate quality from historical selling prices
at the dwelling level. To do so, I estimate pit = π
TTWA
t + αi + ξit by fixed effects to obtain an
estimate for αi. I next use these estimates to compute deciles of the αi distribution for each TTWA
and classify houses using these estimated deciles. Finally, I compute the change in transactions and
prices for each of these groups. Results are presented in Figure 5.
The results are qualitatively the same as those obtained estimating quality using PS-DT groups.
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Figure 5: Change in Prices and Transactions by Quality
Note: Left-panel: Change in average prices between 2007 and 2009 (peak and trough of the aggregate price index
series) for within-TTWA quality deciles. Right-panel: Average change in yearly transactions between 2007 and 2009
for within-TTWA quality deciles. Quality estimated at the level of individual houses in the repeat-sales sample.
The change in prices across the quality distribution (pictured on the top panel) shows no clear
pattern and is fairly homogeneous, between -10% and -5% for all deciles. On the other hand,
transactions (pictured on the bottom panel) fell more for relatively lower quality units (60% against
40% at the upper end of the market), confirming the change in composition discussed above. This
shift is present in the overwhelming majority of TTWAs (not shown).
Both the housing group and repeat-sales methods yield similar result so I conclude that between
2007 and 2009 the drop in transaction volumes was larger at the lower end of the market. But was
this change in the composition of sales specific to this period or does it happen regularly? To answer
this question I construct a panel of PS-DT pairs at the quarterly frequency. For each pair I use the
quality estimates described above and then calculate the correlation between quality and the number
of transactions for each quarter. These correlations are plotted in Figure 6.
We can see that over the 2000-2007 period, the correlation between the quality of traded units
and transactions was relatively stable around 0. Correlations increased abruptly in late 2008 and
17
Figure 6: Correlation between Quality and Transactions
Note: Plot of the cross-sectional correlation between estimated quality and the number of transactions for each semester
between 2000 and 2013. Units are the 36,085 postcode sector - dwelling type pairs with positive sales in the 1997-2007
period.
oscillated around 0.2 thereafter. The timing of this shift largely coincides with the change in borrow-
ing conditions in UK credit markets. Further results on the change in this correlation are presented
in Figure A3, in Appendix 1. While, admittedly, this time-series evidence is not conclusive, it is
consistent with the hypothesis that the stylized fact was related to the reduction in the supply of
high LTV mortgages on offer by British banks during 2008.
Robustness
I have run several complementary tests to confirm the robustness of the empirical results above.
First, I can show that my housing quality estimates are stable over time: a unit which has a high
estimated quality over a given period is very likely to have a high estimated quality for a differ-
ent period. Note that this is not necessarily the case, as units may be remodelled or upgraded,
neighbourhoods may experience change in demographic composition, become gentrified or enter a
phase of decay. Fortunately, the assumption that quality is (approximately) fixed can be tested. For
this purpose, I compute quality estimates for the same unit in different time periods. I then check
whether these estimates fall in similar quantiles of the cross-sectional quality distribution. The
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corresponding rank correlation plots are provided in Figure A4 of Appendix A. The quality cor-
relations for these different periods are all comfortably above 0.9, indicating that the fixed quality
assumption may be a reasonable approximation.
Next, I test whether the stylized facts reported above can be detected using a simpler definition
of quality. To do so, I look at the evolution of sales and prices for different dwelling types, as
recorded in the Land Registry source. I compare observed changes in volumes and prices for the
highest quality type (detached dwellings) and the lowest quality type (terraced housing). Studying
how these houses fared during the crisis confirms the results obtained for more refined definitions
of quality. The share of total transactions of higher quality detached houses increased abruptly in
2008, while that of terraced units fell. Prices dropped for both units in the 2007-2009 period, with
the decline in the price of terraced units being only slightly larger than that for detached houses
(15.1% vs. 13.6 %). These results are reported in Figure A5 of Appendix A.
Finally, I report that the findings above are robust to the inclusion of leaseholds and new-builds
in the analysis. When using this extended sample to detect changes in the composition of sales,
the qualitative picture is very similar: average yearly transactions after 2008 fell more for relatively
lower quality housing. This result is documented in Figure A6 of Appendix A.
I conclude that the stylized facts reported in this section are robust to some key methodolog-
ical choices on how to measure quality or transaction volumes. The next section investigates the
economic origin of these facts.
4. Credit Conditions and the Composition of Sales: Direct Evidence
A large and arguably unexpected change in credit conditions affected British housing markets
in 2008, when banks removed high LTV mortgages from offer in the midst of the Great Reces-
sion. Trends in UK mortgage markets around this year can be observed in Figure 7, which was
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constructed using data from Nationwide mortgages to first-time buyers.11 The left panel shows
that, before 2008, the typical FTB could buy a house by paying a deposit of 10% of the total value
and obtaining a loan on the remaining 90%. With the advent of the financial crisis, median LTVs
for this group decreased abruptly from 90% in early 2007 to roughly 75% by 2009. This change
in median coincided with a broader change in the whole distribution of LTVs. The right panel of
Figure 7, shows how the cumulative distribution of mortgage LTVs to first-time buyers changed
between 2005 and 2011. We can see that much of the mass of the distribution shifted to the left. By
2009, LTVs above 90% had become a negligible fraction of total loans. The change in LTV ratios
implies increased down-payment requirements became necessary for prospective FTBs.12 Survey
evidence from British banks indicates this change in credit conditions was largely supply driven.13
This section tests whether this change in credit conditions affected the composition of sales.
The fact that this was an aggregate shock complicates the empirical analysis because all areas of
the country were affected by this change in lending. However, while the removal of high LTV
mortgages from offer occurred at the national level, its effects are likely to be heterogeneous across
markets. Relatively unaffordable markets, where first-time buyers typically purchase houses using
high LTV mortgages, experienced a sharper tightening of credit conditions than markets where
LTV were initially low to begin with. This provides cross-sectional variation in the change in credit
conditions across markets and motivates the empirical strategy employed. The intuition is that the
size of the shock is larger in cities where households typically needed high LTV loans to become
11Very similar patterns are observed using data from the Council of Mortgage Lenders on all mortgage providers. See
Figure A8 in appendix A.
12Evidence from the Wealth and Assets Survey and the Survey of Building Society Mortgages show that first-time-
buyers are the group taking up the largest LTV mortgages. This is the case because they have lower accumulated wealth
and hence are less capable of paying large deposits.
13The Bank of England’s Credit Conditions Survey records lending availability and borrowing conditions as reported
by British banks. Survey responses indicates i) there was a substantial reduction in credit availability for secured lending
between the last quarter of 2007 and the first of 2009; ii) Maximum Loan-to-Value mortgages offered by British banks
also decreased during this period; iii) there was a substantial tightening of the criteria used to approve borrowers for se-
cured lending, coupled with a substantial reduction in the percentage loan requests being approved; and iv) the reduction
in credit availability was almost entirely concentrated on high LTV mortgages (over 75%). Figures in support of each of
these points are presented in Appendix A (Figure A9).
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Figure 7: Loan-to-Value Ratios - Nationwide Mortgages
Note: Left: Evolution of median Loan-to-Value ratio on mortgages granted to first-time buyers by Nationwide (in per-
centage terms). Right: Cumulative distributions of LTVs for First Time Buyers for years 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 in
the Nationwide dataset.
home-owners.
I build a lower super output area (LSOA) level panel covering 2007 and 2009 and use it to
estimate the effect of the change in credit conditions on sale volumes using specification 1:
∆log(trans)i2009 = β1∆LTVj2009 +β2∆LTVj2009×Qualityi +β3Qualityi +φ∆Xi2009 +∆ǫi2009 (1)
where log(trans)it is the natural logarithm of the number transactions in LSOA i in time t with
t = {2007, 2009}, αi is an LSOA fixed effect, LTVjt is the average Loan-to-Value ratio of first-time
buyer mortgages in city j and period t (measured in percentage points), Qualityi is the LSOA spe-
cific housing quality, estimated as in section 3.1 and normalized to have mean zero and standard
deviation 1, Xit is a set of city and area specific controls, and ǫit is an error term.
14 Time differ-
encing, indicated by ∆, is taken between 2009 and 2007. The set of controls include the city-level
unemployment, employment, participation and youth unemployment rates as well as the fraction of
14We can see this specification as a differenced version of the equation in levels:
log(trans)it = αi + β1LTVjt + β2LTVjt × Qualityi + β3Qualityi × d2009 + δd2009 + φXit + ǫit
Note that d2009 is a fixed effect for observations recorded in 2009. Given that we are using a two period panel, the
within-groups and first-difference estimator coincide.
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workers in professional occupations, obtained from the Annual Population Survey. I also include
the fraction of jobseeker’s benefit claimants, at the LSOA-level, and mean and median wages.15
Under the assumption of strict exogeneity of ∆LTVj2009 and ∆LTVj2009 × Qualityi, β1 measures
the effect of LTV on transaction volumes and β2 measures the differential impact of credit condi-
tions across segments of the housing market. β3 captures whether different segments experienced
different changes in transactions between 2007 and 2009 for other reasons.
Results for OLS estimation of 19 are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. Column 1
presents results without controls, while column 2 includes both city level and area level controls.
In the first place, we can observe that in both columns the effect of credit conditions on transaction
volumes is small and not significantly different from 0. This means that the effect of credit tight-
ening on transactions of houses of average quality is negligible. Our main coefficient of interest
is the one corresponding to ∆LTVj2009 × Qualityi, which is negative and significant. Because the
quality variable is standardized, this indicates that changes in credit conditions will have different
effects on the upper and lower segments of the housing market. For units with quality 1 s.d. below
the mean, a 1 percentage point drop in LTVs reduced transactions by roughly 1 percent (0.7% in
column 2). Taking a 10% drop as an approximation for the average change in LTVs, this would
roughly translate into a 10 percentage point larger drop in transactions at the low end of the market.
The strict exogeneity assumption needed to give causal interpretation to the OLS estimates in
Table 2 is strong. There may be three sources of endogeneity at play. In the first place, reverse
causality could exist if banks change their lending criteria in response to other shocks to housing
markets. This issue is especially important if we take into account that transaction volumes are
known to be a leading indicator of housing market performance (see Miller and Sklarz (1986),
De Wit, Englund and Francke (2013)). A second problem may arise due to measurement error.
15I use data at the most disaggregated level available. Descriptive Statistics for the city level variables are presented in
table A2, in Appendix A.
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Table 2: Change in Loan-to-Value and Transactions (OLS & IV)
OLS IV ( ltv_t – 1 ) IV ( ltv_1999 ) IV (both)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ LTV × Quality -0.010** -0.007** -0.018*** -0.009** -0.046*** -0.010** -0.009**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
∆ LTV -0.001 -0.001 0.012** -0.010
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Quality 0.183*** 0.133*** 0.129*** 0.181*** 0.149*** 0.181*** 0.181***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Job Seekers -12.892***-12.428***-8.193***-10.916***-8.161*** -8.201***
(0.73) (0.82) (0.97) (0.95) (0.97) (0.97)
∆ Unemp. -0.025*** -0.019** -0.012 -0.025 -0.012 -0.012
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
F-stat 1 - - 68 - 17 - -
F-stat 2 - - 47 46 33 35 47
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTWA Effects No No No Yes No Yes Yes
R2 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.20
Observations 33573 33572 33572 33572 33555 33555 33555
Notes: LSOA (Census-area) level regressions. Dependent Variable in all columns is the difference in the logarithm
of transactions in a census area between 2007 and 2009. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimates for coefficients in
equation 1. Columns 3 an 4 correspond to IV estimates using the initial (2007) average LTV to first-time buyers as an
instrument. Columns 5 and 6 use this average for 1999. Column 7 combines both instruments. The list of controls
is reported in the text. Only the coefficients for the change in claimants for the job seeker allowance and changes in
unemployment reported in the table. F-statistics for first-stage regressions included as indicated in the table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ∆LTVj2009 measure used here is based on data for a sample of mortgages from one lender
only. While the data is quite representative of total sales (see Figure A7 in Appendix A), LTV
averages will contain some degree of measurement error and this could bias coefficients towards
zero. Finally, local economic shocks associated to the Great Recession could affect credit and
labour markets to produce a drop in LTVs and sales (for example due to changing incomes for the
young, a channel emphasized for example in Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) and Ortalo-Magne
and Rady (1999)). While controls are included to help deal with some of these confounders, it is
likely that part of the shock operates via unobservable channels.
I propose two alternative solutions to this problem. The first is to use pre-crisis measures of
LTVs to first-time buyers as instruments for ∆LTVj2009. The second is to include travel-to-work
area fixed effects to account for city wide shocks.
If we relax the strict exogeneity assumption invoked above and instead assume that variable
LTVjt is predetermined, we can allow for contemporaneous correlation between this variable and
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the error term (see Arellano (2003)). Under this assumption, E(LTVj2007ǫj2009) = 0, and I can use
LTVj2007 as an instrument for ∆LTVj2009 in estimating equation 1. Moreover, given that Qualityi
is fixed, we can construct an additional instrument LTVj2007Qualityi for the interaction term. One
issue with this instrument is that cross-sectional variation in lending conditions at the onset of the
crisis are themselves related to changes in risk taking behaviour by banks during the pre-crisis
boom.16 In order to avoid this problem, I consider an alternative, LTV1999, which measures average
LTVs in loans to first-time buyers at the TTWA level in 1999. This will still be related to affordabil-
ity in English cities (and to the need of high LTV mortgages by FTBs) but not to changes in credit
conditions in the run-up to the crisis. The relevance condition for these instruments is satisfied as
can be seen in the F-statistics reported in Table 2.
Results for the IV estimation of equation 1 using instruments LTV2007 and LTV1999 are provided
in columns 3 and 5 of Table 2, respectively. For both instruments, we observe that the coefficient
on ∆LTV × Quality is negative and significant. The coefficient on ∆LTV is significant and has
the expected sign in the case of the first instrument, but is not significantly different from 0 when
instrumenting with LTV1999. I can use these coefficients to calculate the effect of a change in LTVs
on sales of properties with qualities 1 s.d. below the mean. In the case of column 3, the combined
effect of a percentage point reduction in LTVs on these properties would be a 3% reduction in
transactions (0.0125-(-0.0181)=3.06%) and is significant at all conventional levels. For column 5,
the same effect would be 4.62%. These are large effects, which could account for much of the
observed heterogeneity in the evolution of sales between 2007 and 2009. The coefficients are larger
than those for OLS, perhaps due to the fact that IV estimates are less likely to be rigged with
measurement error. I conclude from these results that credit tightening had a substantial impact on
the reduction of transaction volumes at the lower end of the market.
16This would be the case especially if there was a substantial expansion of credit in the United Kingdom in the 2000-
2007 period. While this is certainly the case in the United States – and did affect subsequent market outcomes (Mian and
Sufi (2009)) – lending conditions had been relatively lax in England and Wales for some time. See left panel of Figure 7.
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The assumptions required to give causal interpretation to the IV estimates in Table 2 are still
relatively strong and deserve further discussion. If markets with initially high LTV ratios experi-
enced large negative economic shocks in 2008-2009, these assumptions would be violated. To test
whether this is the case, I run a series of balancing checks by estimating univariate regressions of
the instruments on city-level variables measuring changes in economic conditions. Estimates from
these regressions are reported in Table 3. We observe that in all but one case there is no statisti-
cally significant relationship between the instruments and the covariates, which is reassuring. I do
find a significant partial correlation between the IVs and the fraction of population receiving the
job-seeker allowance. Recall I have included this fraction as a control in all specifications.
Table 3: Balancing Tests
D. Unemp D. Employ D. Inactive D. SelfEmp D. Profess
LTVt–1 0.0303 -0.0116 -0.00580 -0.0397 0.0248
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 186 186 186 186 185
D. High Edu D. YouthUnemp D. Seekers D. Mean W D. Median W
LTVt–1 0.0459 -0.00980 0.0191*** 0.300 0.440
(0.07) (0.04) (0.00) (0.64) (0.44)
Observations 186 186 186 186 186
D. Unemp D. Employ D. Inactive D. SelfEmp D. Profess
LTV1999 0.0504 0.0775 -0.154* -0.0484 -0.00418
(0.03) (0.10) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 185 185 185 185 184
D. High Edu D. YouthUnemp D. Seekers D. Mean W D. Median W
LTV1999 0.0287 -0.00183 0.0297*** 0.540 0.868
(0.08) (0.06) (0.01) (0.83) (0.64)
Observations 185 185 185 185 185
Notes: Balancing checks for the instrumental variables used in this section. TTWA level regressions in all specifications
suing univariate regressions of selected controls on the instruments. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 186 TTWAs
in total (1 missing LTV data in 1999).
Perhaps some remaining unobserved variation in city-level economic performance could still
be correlated with the instruments. In order to further explore this, I modify equation 19 to include
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interaction terms ∆Xi2009 × Quality. Coefficient estimates for these interacted controls can indi-
cate whether business cycle shocks have a differential effect on transactions across segments of the
housing market and threaten instrument validity through this channel. Estimates and joint signifi-
cance test statistics are provided in Table A3 in Appendix B. Almost all of the coefficients on these
interaction terms are insignificant. Importantly, they are jointly insignificant at all conventional lev-
els. I interpret these estimates as indicating that economic performance did not have a substantial
heterogeneous effect on the change in transaction volumes.
I also re-estimate equation 19 including TTWA fixed effects. These will account for any city
level shocks over the 2007 – 2009 period. Variable ∆ LTV will be subsumed by these fixed effects,
but we can still estimate the differential effect of credit tightening on transactions for different
segments of the housing market. Results are provided in columns 4 and 6 of Table 2. I obtain
very similar coefficients on variable ∆LTV × Quality in both columns. Column 4 indicates that for
properties with a quality 1 standard deviation below the mean, a 1 percent reduction in LTV ratios
leads to a 0.9% reduction in transaction volumes. In the case of column 6, this effect is 1%. We
can also combine both instruments in one specification, as reported in column 7. The effect is now
0.9%.17 Note that the resulting coefficients are now quite close to those obtained under OLS.
Thus far this section has discussed the link between credit conditions and transaction volumes, I
now briefly turn my attention to the case of housing prices. I re-estimate equation 19, but now using
∆pricej2009 as the dependent variable. In this way, I try to capture whether credit conditions had a
differential effect on prices across different segments of the housing market. OLS and IV estimates
for these coefficients are provided in Table 4. Results are consistent with the descriptive patterns
observed in section 3. There is no evidence that relative prices of low quality housing decreased in
places which experienced a sharper tightening in credit.
17The over-identification test in this specification does not reject the null of valid instruments with a p-value of 0.58.
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Table 4: Change in Loan-to-Value and Prices (OLS & IV)
OLS IV ( ltv_t – 1 ) IV ( ltv_1999 ) IV (both)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ LTV × Quality 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0016 0.0004 0.0002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ LTV -0.0002 -0.0011* -0.0010
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quality 0.0105*** 0.0110*** 0.0134*** 0.0106*** 0.0134*** 0.0134***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Job Seekers -1.0012*** -0.9971*** -0.7069** -1.0553*** -0.7138** -0.7068**
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32)
∆ Unemp. -0.0060*** -0.0064*** -0.0058** -0.0064*** -0.0059** -0.0058**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
F-stat 1 - 68 - 17 - -
F-stat 2 - 47 46 33 35 47
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTWA Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Observations 33572 33572 33572 33555 33555 33555
Notes: LSOA (Census-area) level regressions. Dependent variable in all columns is the difference in the logarithm of
average prices in a census area (cross sectional unit) between 2007 and 2009. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimates
for coefficients in equation 1. Columns 3 an 4 correspond to IV estimates using the initial (2007) average LTV to first-
time buyers as an instrument. Columns 5 and 6 use this measure for 1999. Column 7 combines both instruments. List
of controls as highlighted in the text. Only the coefficients for the change in claimants for the job seeker allowance and
changes in unemployment reported in the Table.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
5. Model
I now present a deterministic overlapping generations framework in which credit conditions
affect the composition of housing transactions. As in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2004) and Ortalo-
Magne and Rady (2006), the model features heterogeneity both in dwelling types and household
incomes, and transactions are intergenerational transfers of houses. In my framework, older, wealth-
ier households can become landlords of starter units and therefore compete for ownership with the
young households. Some of these young households become renters and are effectively priced out
of home-ownership. Affordability for younger households will be determined by credit conditions.
With abundant credit, young households have more available resources to compete for ownership.
Tighter credit will benefit wealth-rich landlords.
I first show analytically that steady states (SS) with tighter credit constraints have a relatively
smaller fraction of sales in the lower side of the market and a larger fraction of households living
as renters. Importantly, changes in the composition of transactions arise because of changes in the
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number of units that are retained and rented out by wealthy households when moving up the housing
ladder. In this way, I emphasize the role of let-to-buy (moving up without selling the starter home) in
affecting housing sale volumes and the inter-generational competition for ownership.18 Depending
on parameter values, the model can accommodate several different lifetime tenure transitions. I
study steady state equilibria in which younger, poorer agents are renters and older, richer agents are
landlords residing in high quality housing. I show credit tightening affects the composition of sales
for these steady state allocations.
In order to explore transition dynamics in response to a permanent, unexpected shock to credit
conditions, I solve the model numerically for different sets of parameters. Convergence to the
new steady state can take several periods, as prices and wealth levels are jointly and dynamically
determined. I show that the model can feature transitions in which the short run impact of the credit
shock coincides, qualitatively, with the prediction obtained from a steady state comparison.
The model will yield a set of additional testable hypotheses at the micro level which will be
tested separately in section 6.
5.1. Setup
Incomes
Consider an overlapping generations economy with no uncertainty in which agents live for three
periods. Agents are born without wealth but are heterogeneous in their incomes. At ages a = 1, 2, 3
agents of type i ∈ [0, 1] receive an endowment ea(i) where the functions ea : [0, 1] → R
+ are
continuous and strictly increasing. We can think of these functions as the inverse cdf of incomes
for each age cohort. I assume that ea+1(i) > ea(i) ∀i. To save on notation, I define function e(i)
corresponding to the accumulated lifetime endowments on period 2, if all period 1 income is saved
18The term let-to-buy is used in the United Kingdom to refer to transitions in which a household trades up the ladder
and rents out the unit where they resided when young. Not to be confused with buy-to-let, which is associated to expressly
buying a unit to rent it out.
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at interest rate r (i.e. e(i) ≡ e1(i)(1 + r) + e2(i)). Note that function e(i) is again continuous and
strictly increasing.
Housing Stock & Ownership
There is a fixed stock of housing units S = SL + SH with SL and SH being the stock of low and
high type dwellings respectively. I assume S < 2 which ensures positive rental prices. I also assume
SL > 1 and SH > 1/2. The housing stock owned by an agent of age a and type i at the beginning
of period t is given by vector ht(i, a) = (hL,t, hH,t)′. Scalars hL,t and hH,t record the number of type
L and H properties owned by the agent, respectively. Households can own more than one dwelling
and rent it out in exchange for rental income. Prices for low and high houses in period t are pL,t and
pH,t, respectively. Alternatively, agents can rent a house by paying Rt. Rents are paid in advance.
These prices are determined endogenously in the model.
Preferences
Households have preferences over housing and a numeraire consumption good. Their per period
utility function is given by U(ct, ht) = ct + uh(τt), where ct indicates consumption of the numeraire
and τt indicates residential choice at the beginning of the period. Utility from housing depends on
consumption ct and housing tenure τt = (τR,t, τL,t, τH,t)′ with the elements of vector τ taking value 1
depending on the type of residence (rental, home-ownership of an L or an H unit). The contribution





0 if live with parents / social housing (τt = 0)
µvL if renting L (τR,t = 1)
vL if owner occupier L (τL,t = 1)
vH if owner occupier H (τH,t = 1)
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Some agents may not be able to obtain access to a dwelling through the private market. We
can think of these agents as residing in social housing or living with their parents, which provide
minimal housing services at a price equal to the agent’s current income.19 They receive 0 utility
from these housing services. Agents renting low or high type units receive utility µvL.
20 Owner
occupiers receive utilities vL and vH , respectively. Note that µ < 1 indicates utility from renting
is lower than utility from owner-occupation. Housing ownership ht and tenure τt will be tightly
related, as only agents owning a unit can be owner-occupiers.
Agents discount future utility at rate β. The interest rate on borrowing and saving is r. I will
assume β (1 + r) ≥ 1. Combined with linearity of consumption in the utility function, this ensures
we can assume without loss of generality that all consumption takes place in the last period. This
feature is drawn from Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) and allows us to focus on the role of credit
conditions on determining housing market decisions.
Borrowing Constraints
Collateralized borrowing is available to households. Credit constraints enter the model via a
minimum down-payment requirement. Agents can borrow up to γ pj,t when buying a type j unit
in period t and therefore have to pay a down-payment equal to pj,t (1 – γ). We can see γ as the
maximum available LTV ratio on mortgages. Importantly, agents can only have a mortgage on one
of their housing units so that mortgage debt does not scale with the number of dwellings owned.
This assumption plays an important role in Proposition 1. I further assume r < min{γ, 1 – γ}.
Combined with the assumption of increasing incomes by age, this ensures all households that take
on debt can pay interest on this debt in steady state. There is no default on debt.
19The fact that some agents do not have access to property via the private market is a necessary consequence of the
assumption that S < 2. Agents are assumed to pay off their income as social rent (or transfer to parents) to ensure next
period wealth is still monotonous in i.
20The fact that rental utility is invariant with housing type explains why there is only one rental price Rt.
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Supply of Rented Dwellings
Rental supply is comprised of households owning more than one dwelling and renting these out
as landlords. Define λt(i, a) as the number of properties rented out by an agent of age a and type i at
the beginning of period t. By assumption, deep-pocketed investors do not participate in real estate
markets. As a result, the typical no-arbitrage condition is not met and the present discounted value
of rental income can be different from the price of low type housing in equilibrium, which allows
pL,t and Rt to evolve independently.
21 Together with the lower utility resulting from renting, this
assumption is critical to ensure that credit constraints have an impact on prices and transactions.
Timing
Timing is as follows. Within each period agents first derive housing utility, they receive their
corresponding endowment ea(i), pay interests on debt, receive interest from savings, trade in the
low-type housing market, trade in the high-type housing market and, finally, derive utility from
consumption of the numeraire good. Because agents only enjoy housing utility at the beginning of
the period (and they are born with no housing wealth) the maximum possible demand for housing
is equal to 2: demand from age 1 and age 2 agents. I will sometimes refer to these two groups as
young (age 1) and old (age 2) agents.
Choice Variables, State Variables and Inter-temporal Decisions
Every period, agents decide whether to buy units, whether to become landlords and where to
reside at the beginning of the next period, as well as whether to consume or save. Hence, in principle
they choose ct, ht+1, τt+1,λt+1. However, this can be simplified substantially. Households owning
more than one property will always rent out additional properties to obtain Rt if Rt ≥ 0. Hence,
the choice of λt+1 is given directly by ht+1. Formally, λt+1(i, a) =
∑
hL,t+1(i, a) + hH,t+1(i, a) – 1
21This will mean that nothing guarantees r pL,t 6= R in equilibrium. While the absence of institutional investors in the
model may seem puzzling, recent reports on the matter indicate the UK market for private rented dwellings is dominated
by small investors (see Montague and collaborators (2012)).
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if hL,t+1(i, a) + hH,t+1(i, a) > 0 and 0 otherwise. Moreover, given ht+1, some aspects of residential
choice are known because the first home is always owner-occupied (if vH and vL are sufficiently
high). Finally, as discussed above, all consumption takes place in the last period of households’
lives so all resources not used in housing markets are saved by agents of ages 1 and 2. As a result,
decisions over ht+1 and τt are sufficient to characterize all household choices.
The state variables for this economy will be the amounts of non-housing net wealth and housing
wealth for every agent at the beginning of period t. Non-housing net wealth is recorded as b(i, a)
and maps agents’ type and age to the real line. In the case of housing wealth h(i, a), this will be a
function from agent’s type and age to the set of feasible ownership combinations. In this context,
agents’ value functions at age a are:
Va(b, h) = max
τ ′,h′
c + uh(τ ) + βV
a+1(b′, h′)
Policy functions τ ′(i, x, a) and h′(i, x, a), map the state of the economy (x) and the household
type and age to their optimal decisions. Agents can only choose the housing services they will enjoy
at the beginning of the next period.
The law of motion for individual non-housing wealth at the beginning of a period is:
b′ = (1 + r)(ea(i)(1 – 1{τ
′ = 0}) + b – c – Pown(h′ – h) + R(λ – τR)) (2)
where τR takes value 1 if the agent lived in rented accommodation in period t and λ′ indicates
the number of properties rented out as a landlord in that period. A full description of the value
functions in each period, as well as a definition of the recursive equilibrium is provided in appendix
B.
Equilibrium
Housing market equilibrium is a set of prices Pt = (Rt, pL,t, pH,t), gross savings bt(i, a) and
housing allocations ht(i, a) in the age-type space [0, 1] × {1, 2}, as well as residential decisions
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τt(i, a), such that households make optimal choices given their budget and credit constraints, and





DH1 (Pt) + D
H
1 (Pt) = SH
DR1 (Pt) + D
R
2 (Pt) = S
R(Pt)
Where Dha is the demand of h tenure (Rented, Low-type home-owner, High-type home-owner) by
age a agents buying or renting that period and SR is the supply of rented dwellings.
Parameter Conditions
I will impose a set of parameter conditions to ensure that credit constraints are binding for
all households (i.e. incentives to become a home-owner/landlord are always present). I will also
impose a series of additional conditions to ensure the steady state equilibrium includes lifetime
transitions following a housing ladder, where old potential landlords can outbid prospective young
buyers for ownership of low type housing.
The conditions imposed on preference parameters are the following:




µvL > e1(2 – SL – SH) (3.2)
(1 + µ)vL > vH (3.3)
vH – vL >
r
1 – γ
(e(1) – e1(2 – SL – SH)) (3.4)
e1(2 – SL – SH) > re1(1)(1 – γ)
–1 (3.5)
These conditions ensure that owner occupation is always worth the user cost of housing (3.1),
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that renting is always worth the rental price (3.2), that households will not downsize housing con-
sumption today to ensure better quality housing consumption in the future (3.3), that higher quality
housing consumption is guaranteed to be worth the user cost in equilibrium (3.4), and that it is
profitable to become a landowner of a type L unit (3.5).
Additional conditions are imposed on other model parameters including conditions on the distri-
bution of incomes by age. These are required to restrict steady state allocations to those displaying
a ladder structure:
e2(0) > e1(2 – SL – SH) (4.1)
e1(1) < e(1 – SH) – e1(2 – SL – SH) (4.2)
e(SH) – e(1 – SH) >
e1(1 – SH)
1 – γ
– e1(2 – SL – SH) (4.3)
e(1) < e(1 – SH) +
2 + r
1 – γ
e1(1 – SH) – (2 + r)e1(2 – SL – SH) (4.4)
2 – γ
1 – γ
e1(2 – SL – SH) > e(1 – SH) (4.5)
These conditions ensure that only young agents priced out of the private market (4.1), that only
old agents reside in type H properties (4.2), that rental markets exist and marginal owners of H units
were renters when young (4.3), and that no landlords rent out two properties (4.4 and 4.5).22
I formally lay out the link between these statements and assumptions 3.1 to 4.5 in Appendix B.
5.2. Steady State
Price Bounds
Under these assumptions, feasibility of housing choices will be determined by credit constraints
and prices. We can use these constraints to obtain bounds on prices for H and L type units. We can
also use household income directly to pin down the rental price when rental markets exist. These
22A simple example of housing stock, credit constraints and interest that would satisfy these conditions would be
SH = 0.85, 2 – SH – SL = 0.05, r = 0.01, γ = 0.8 for uniform income distributions e1(i) ∼ U[2, 4] and e2(i) ∼ U[2.5, 15].
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yield price bounds:
pH ≤ e(1 – SH)(1 – γ)
–1 (5.1)
pL ≥ e1(2 – SL – SH) (1 – γ)
–1 (5.2)
R = e1(2 – SL – SH) if rental markets exist (5.3)
Proofs for these statements are provided in the theoretical appendix. Intuitively, the first state-
ment follows from the fact that otherwise pH would be so high that the richest SH mass of agents in
the economy cannot afford an H unit and markets cannot clear. Statement 5.2 follows from the fact
that if pL was lower than this level, more than SH + SL households will be able to afford a unit. The
condition on rents is also determined by market clearing condition in residential markets.
Allocations
Thresholds in the type distribution of households at every age will determine the steady state
mass of homeless agents, demands for renting, owner-occupation of L units, owner-occupation of




L are the thresholds beyond which young
agents can afford to rent and to buy a low dwelling, respectively. Likewise, ioH and i
o
HL are the
thresholds above which agents can afford owning a low type dwelling, a high type dwelling or
owning both a high and a low unit at the end of period 2 (landlords), respectively.23
Most of these thresholds are derived from credit constraints. Let us take threshold i
y
L as an
example. This will be the threshold in the type distribution such that young households can barely




1 (PL(1 – γ). The case of the
marginal renters depends directly on having sufficient income to afford a rent, but is otherwise
similar. Expressions for all thresholds can be found in Appendix B.
23Sub-indices for each threshold are as follows. Sub-index R corresponds to thresholds for rental affordability (agents
to the right of the threshold can rent), L corresponds to owner-occupation of a low type unit, H corresponds to occupation
of an H unit, and HL to ownership of both an H and an L unit (agents residing in H and renting out the other property).
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R L H HL
Note: End of period housing unit allocations by household type (horizontal lines) and age. Thresholds i
age
j determined
endogenously indicated below each line. Allocations indicated above the type-line for each age. ∅ corresponds to
homeless agents, R to renters, L and H to owner occupiers of low and high type units, respectively, and HL to landlords
owning both a low and a high type unit. Case covered in the proof of Proposition 1 in the text.
In general, the relative position of all thresholds in steady state and, hence, the lifetime housing
transitions, depend on model parameters. But we can use price bounds 5.1 to 5.3, price ordering
R(1–γ)–1 < pL < pH and assumptions 3.5 to 4.5 to show that steady state allocations will be similar





























5.3. Credit Constraints and the Composition of Housing Sales
Using the affordability thresholds above, we can write demands for different types of units for


















DH2 = 1 – i
o
H
SR = 1 – ioHL
Rental demand by young agents, DR1 , is given by agents that can afford to rent but cannot afford
a down-payment for an L unit. Demand for owner-occupation of low-type units will be given by the
mass of agents who can afford the corresponding down-payment. Demands for old agents can be
obtained analogously. Finally, supply of rental units is equal to the mass of landlords, which will
be given by SR = 1 – i
o
HL.
Now that we have all the expressions for demand and supply, we can re-write the housing market
equilibrium conditions for the two property markets and the rental market. We are left with:







L = 1 – i
o
HL (7.2)
In addition to these equilibrium conditions we can also write down the expressions for transaction
volumes as a result of the thresholds in i. Transactions of low units are equal to the mass of L units
bought by young agents plus the mass of L units bought by old agents. These will be given by:







trH = 1 – i
o
H (9)
We can use the equilibrium conditions 7.1 and 7.2 to study how SS prices and allocations depend
on γ and how a change in credit conditions affects the composition of housing transactions. This is
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the main result of this theoretical framework and is provided in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
Steady states with lower γ have i) lower values of
trL
trL + trH
and ii) higher values of SR if housing
allocations can be described by (6).
Proof: See Appendix B.
The proof uses market clearing conditions to identify how endogenous property prices respond
to changes in γ. Combined with the expressions for trL, trH and SR, these show that SS with tighter
credit have a lower fraction of L transactions and a larger fraction of renters. The proposition can be
proved analogously for steady-state allocations different from those outlined in 6. Several of these
alternative cases are covered in Appendix B.24
Tighter credit translates into lower SS prices in the L and H markets while leaving rents un-
affected (given 5.3). As a result, the number of old households able to keep their low type home
when moving up the ladder increases with smaller γ. Because old agents are better able to price
out young prospective buyers when credit is scarce, an increase in γ increases the stock of renters
living in low type dwellings. Transaction volumes of these units decrease with tighter credit as less
households retain their starter properties when trading up. An illustration of the effect of credit
tightening on the allocation of units is presented in Figure 9. The same proof can be used to show
the opposite happens with increased credit availability.
5.4. Transitions: Numerical Analysis
The dynamic structure of the model links current wealth with prices in previous and subsequent
periods. These, in turn, will be affected by credit conditions. As a result, it is unlikely that tran-
sitions between steady states will be instantaneous. In order to study these transitions, I now turn
24For example, proposition 1 can also be proved for the case in which some young agents own H units.
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Note: Figure displays the change in steady-state allocations resulting from a tightening of credit conditions. With tighter
credit the fraction of agents retaining their L unit when moving up the ladder increases, as does the fraction of renters.
to a numerical analysis of the response of the key objects in proposition 1 (i.e. fraction of renters,
transaction volumes) to an unexpected and permanent increase in down-payment requirements.
The code is set up to closely follow a discretized version of the recursive equilibrium definition
that can be found in Appendix B. A discrete number N of agents are born each period, so that 2N
agents demand housing at any point in time. Income distributions and parameters are chosen to
satisfy assumptions 3.1 to 4.5, so that steady state allocations can be characterized by 6. The shock
is modelled as an unexpected reduction in γ taking place in period 0. The transition path of prices
pL and pH is selected so as to ensure markets clear throughout the transition period. Agents in the
model are forward looking, so if future prices influence current decisions, the whole transition has
to be solved for simultaneously. However, if vL, vH and µ values are sufficiently large, agents’
decisions will continue to be solely determined by current credit conditions, as current utility flows
strictly dominate the effect of future capital gains (or losses).25
The set of parameters used to illustrate transitions is provided in Table 5. Total housing stock is
SL + SH = 1950 and N = 1000, so that only 2.5% agents will be priced out of the private housing
market in equilibrium. Income distributions are uniform in all periods.26 Incomes for old agents
25In order to determine transition prices, I first find the price vector that clears housing markets with myopic agents
and then verify that this transition also clears the market when agents are forward looking. For sufficiently low values of
vL and vH , or a sufficiently large change in γ the price paths for myopic and forward looking agents may not coincide.
This is not the case for the parameters in Table 5.
26Uniform distributions are chosen for income because they allow to easily verify assumptions 3.5 to 4.5 are met.
Examples of transitions for other distributions are provided in Appendix B.
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are substantially larger than incomes for the young. Qualitatively, this is consistent with observed
patterns and is required so that some old agents are able to price the young out of ownership at
relatively high values of γ. The initial steady state is characterized by a maximum LTV of γ = 0.85.
I separately study the transitions as a response of a drop to γf 1 = 0.8 and a drop to γf 2 = 0.75, both
events representing a sudden tightening of credit.
Table 5: Numerical Analysis: Parameter Values
Parameters vL vH µ SL SH r γi γf1 γf2
Value 200 280 0.5 1050 900 0.01 0.85 0.8 0.75
Income Distributions
Period 1 U[2, 4]
Period 2 U[3, 20]
Period 3 U[3, 20]
# of Households (born in t) 1000
Note: Parameters and income distributions for numerical analysis. Parameter γi, represents initial maximum LTV ratios,
γf1 indicates final γ after a 5 p.p reduction, and γf2 indicates final γ after a 10 p.p reduction.
Transitions between steady states for LTV shocks of different magnitudes are reported in Figure
10. Shocks arrive in period 0. The left panel represents the evolution of transaction volumes for
both L and H dwellings. Transactions of H dwellings are represented by the gray line. These
are unaffected by credit tightening, as prices adjust to neutralize the shock and allocations do not
change. The series for transaction volumes of L dwellings are represented in black lines. The
solid and dashed lines represent the transition for a 10 p.p and a 5 p.p exogenous drop in LTV,
respectively. In both cases we observe that sales of L units fall on impact, more so in the case of
the larger shock, as expected. Transactions trL continue to fall one period after the shock, before
oscillating to convergence subsequently. The right panel represents the change in the fraction of
renters in response to the shock. Again, the fraction of renters increases on impact and on the
period after the shock, and later oscillates to convergence. The initial effect of credit tightening
is partially muted because old potential landlords start period 0 with a substantial amount of debt
acquired under the high LTV regime. After these have passed, transactions reach their trough.
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Figure 10: Transitions after Credit Shock
Note: Left-panel represents the time series of transaction volumes for H and L type dwellings. The horizontal axis
represents time, and the vertical axis represents number of sales. The gray line corresponds to trH , and black lines
correspond to trL. Right-panel represents the time series for the fraction of renters, represented in the vertical axis. An
unexpected, permanent shock to credit conditions takes place in period 0. Solid lines represent transitions for a 10 p.p.
drop in γ. Dashed lines represent transitions for a 5 p.p. drop in γ.
Oscillations also result from this initial difference.
Figure 10 reveals that, for this set of parameters, the intuition obtained from the comparative
statics carries when looking at the transition period. When credit tightens, transactions fall at the
lower end of the market and the fraction of renters increases as more old agents become landlords
by holding to their starter house. It is important to note that other sets of parameters may lead to
similar transitions. Appendix B provides a sensitivity analysis by discussing three examples for
other parameter choices, including the case of non-uniform income distributions.
5.5. Discussion
Three comments are due regarding the model and its main results. The role of dual owners is
critical to link transaction volumes with credit conditions, both in the short term and when com-
paring steady states. Note this differs from the mechanism in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), in
which trade-downs by older agents are used to link γ with transaction volumes. I do not include
trade downs in this framework and certainly these do exist, but there is evidence that the scale of
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these housing market transitions is small (Yang (2009)).
The down-payment requirements are specified with the standard multiplicative form. However,
it is necessary that collateralized borrowing is only available for one unit so that maximum borrow-
ing in this context is pHγ, even if a household owns multiple units. Otherwise, borrowing scales
with the number of units, new prices exactly offset changes in credit conditions and allocations are
unaffected by credit tightening.27
The model provides a channel linking credit conditions to the composition of transactions. The
presence of a rental market is necessary for this channel to exist. The crucial role of rental markets
has the advantage of being an implication from the mechanism that can be tested at the micro level.
Intergenerational differences in the effects of credit tightening also play a crucial role in the model.
Both aspects will be evaluated empirically in the next section.
6. Supporting Evidence
The model indicates that credit tightening increases renting by the young at the lower end of
the market. The change in rented stock needed to house those renters comes from a reduction of
sales in those segments. In this section, I present different estimates showing this mechanism can
explain the results in sections 3 and 4. I show that the reduction in transaction volumes was stronger
in LSOAs where renting increased. Therefore, the increase in rental supply was not provided by
individual investors buying units to let. I also show that this correlation emerges exactly on 2008,
as expected. Using individual data for a sample of English dwellings, I show that renting increased
especially in relatively lower quality units after 2008. Finally, I also re-estimate equation 1 using
the change in the fraction of renters as my outcome variable so as to directly test the effect of credit
conditions on renting. Estimates show that changes in credit conditions had heterogeneous effects
27The fact that borrowing does not scale with housing wealth is broadly consistent with observed patterns in the Wealth
and Assets Survey. That being said, this is a consequence of agent’s decisions and not a constraint imposed by lenders.
So we can interpret the non-scalability assumption as a reduced-form alternative to a full characterization of households’
borrowing decisions.
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on the fraction of renters across qualities.
I also show that there was an age pattern in the fall in transactions, with sales falling more in
relatively young neighbourhoods. This is further evidence that it was houses typically bought by
FTBs that experienced the strongest reduction in sales. Again, the correlation is observed after
2008, coinciding with the contraction in credit.
Evidence from the Rental Market
The fraction of people living as renters in England increased from 12.8% in 2008 to 16.4%
in 2012.28 But where did this extra supply of rented housing come from? Building activity had
stalled. In addition, the number of buy-to-let loans had dropped abruptly after 2007 so it is unlikely
that buy-to-let could provide the units for this increase in renting. Moreover, a rush of investor
buying would have increased transactions at the lower rungs of the housing ladder, which is the
opposite of what I report in my stylized facts. The model may provide an answer: when credit
tightens the extra supply of rental units comes from increases in let-to-buy.
Disaggregated information on housing tenure is available at the LSOA level for the 2001 and
2011 census.29 I use this information to compute the increase in the fraction of private renters over
this period. I expect the change in renting will be negatively correlated with the change in average
yearly transactions between the boom and bust periods. The corresponding scatter plot is presented
in the left panel of Figure 11. I also use my 2007-2009 LSOA panel to estimate regressions of
the change in renting on the change in transactions after including different sets of controls and/or
TTWA fixed effects. Results are reported in Table A4 in Appendix A. In all specifications the
correlation is negative and strongly significant.
While this correlation is suggestive, it is only consistent with the proposed explanation if it arises
28The evolution of the fraction of renters is reported in the left panel of Figure A10 in Appendix A. The right panel
shows the evolution of aggregate buy-to-let lending.
29Unfortunately, disaggregated data on renting is not available at the yearly frequency. Most of the increase in renting
over the 2001-2011 period took place after 2008. Moreover, the increase in renting between 2002 and 2008 was mainly
fuelled by purchases by buy-to-let investors which should have a positive effect on transactions.
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Figure 11: Rental Markets and Transaction Volumes
Note: Left-panel: Plots the drop in average yearly transactions between the boom (200-2007) and bust (2009-2011)
periods at the LSOA level in the vertical axis against the increase in the fraction of renters over total households between
2001 and 2011 in the horizontal axis. The slope of the fitted linear equation is -1.05 and is significant at conventional
levels. Right-panel: Time-series of the cross-sectional correlations between the difference in the fraction of renters
between 2001 and 2011, and the number of transactions for each semester between 2000 and 2013.
after 2008, when credit tightening took place. To test this, I calculate the cross-sectional correlations
between the ∆Rentj and transj for every semester between 2001 and 2011. The correlations are
plotted in the right panel of Figure 11. A change in the sign of the correlation takes place during
2008, coinciding with credit tightening.
I can also use individual property data to show that the increase in renting after 2008 was
concentrated on the lower end of the market, consistently with the model predictions. For this
purpose, I use the English Housing Survey (EHS), a yearly survey of the English housing stock.30
The EHS includes housing characteristics and prices which allow to estimate a hedonic model and
obtain a proxy for housing quality using characteristics related to size (number of bedrooms, number
of bathrooms, number of living rooms), building age and region of each unit. I then use this proxy
to study how the quality composition of rented stock changed over time. A detailed account of this
exercise is reported in Appendix A. The main result is that the quality composition of rented stock
30I use the waves between 2004 and 2011 and restrict my sample to owner-occupied and private rental dwellings.
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was stable between 2004 and 2007, before changing abruptly in 2008 and stabilizing thereafter. The
increase in renting was concentrated in relatively low-quality segments.
To directly test whether credit tightening caused these changes in rental markets, I re-estimate
equation 1 using differences in the fraction of renters between 2001 and 2011 as my outcome
variable. Estimates for variants of this specification are reported in Table 6. The main coefficient
of interest is the effect of the interaction between ∆LTV and the standardized quality measure. We
observe that it has the expected positive sign and is significant across all specifications. A tightening
of credit conditions will lead to relatively higher renting in the lower end of the market. We also find
a counter-intuitive positive effect of ∆LTV on renting in columns 1 to 3 and 5. This would indicate
that credit tightening would lead to a reduction in renting on average. One potential explanation
is that part of the change in renting may have happened before 2007 and could have been larger
in markets with initially high LTV levels. To deal with this issue and other potential confounding
factors, I also provide estimates including TTWA-fixed effects in columns 4 and 6. This yields
positive coefficients on ∆LTV ×Quality, as expected, indicating that a reduction in LTVs will have
a positive effect on renting for units below average quality. The coefficient is strongly significant
for column 6, indicating that, for units with quality 1 s.d. below the mean, a 1 percentage point
drop in LTVs increases renting by 0.353%. Note that the coefficient in column 4 is also positive,
but not significant (p-value: 18%). With this caveat in mind, I interpret this as evidence that credit
tightening leads to more renting at the lower end of the housing market.
Transactions and Household Age
Young households move to neighbourhoods where other young people live in search for lower
prices, but also adequate local amenities, quality schooling, etc.31 While the model in section 5 does
31The striking persistence of average age the LSOA level is evidence of this. LSOAs experienced a median change in
the average age of their residents of only -0.1 between 2001 and 2011 with 90% of areas changing by less than 3 years.
This persistence implies that the young move with the young (and the old with the old) on average.
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Table 6: Change in Loan-to-Value and Fraction of Private Renting (OLS & IV)
OLS IV ( ltvt–1 ) IV ( ltv1999 )
∆ LTV × Quality 0.153** 0.111** 0.165*** 0.0995 0.475*** 0.353***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
∆ LTV 0.118** 0.0965*** 0.146*** 0.676***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.22)
Quality 0.590 0.770 1.106* -0.116 3.167*** 1.840***
(0.94) (0.62) (0.57) (0.69) (0.63) (0.59)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTWA Effects No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 34309 34308 34308 34308 34291 34291
Notes: LSOA level regressions. Dependent variable in all specifications is the change in the fraction of households
living in private renting accommodation taken between the 2001 and 2011 census. Columns 1 and 2 correspond to
OLS estimates while the remaining columns correspond to IV estimates, with instruments indicated in the table header.
Standard errors clustered at the TTWA level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
not explicitly distinguish between young and old neighbourhoods, it does predict less transactions
by the young. I can test whether this is consistent with observed patterns.
For this purpose I use population and age structure data from the ONS disaggregated at the
LSOA level for 2007. This allows me to know the fraction of population by age group for all the
LSOAs in England and Wales. I combine this information with my transactions dataset to check if
the drop in transactions and prices had an age profile. The results are illustrated in Figure 12. I plot
the change in average yearly transactions between the pre-crisis (2000-2007) and crisis (2009-2011)
periods against the mean adult (over 25) population for each LSOA. The upward sloping pattern is
clear: transactions dropped less in areas populated by older households, with a correlation of 0.4.
Again, I test the robustness of this relationship by running a regression of the change in trans-
actions between 2007 and 2009 on the mean adult age in a given LSOA. The resulting estimates are
presented in Table A6 in Appendix A. Across specifications we observe that the coefficient on Age
is positive and significant. These coefficients confirm the robustness of the correlation reported in
Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Difference in Transactions by LSOA Mean Age
Note: The figure plots the average change in yearly transactions between benchmark (1995-2007) and crisis periods
(2008-2013) in the vertical axis and the mean adult age at the Lower Super Output Area level. Adults are defined as
individuals of age above 25. The slope of the fitted linear equation is 1.27 and statistically significant at conventional
levels.
7. Alternative Explanations
We know changing credit conditions are by no means the only possible driver of variation in
housing turnover or tenure choice. The stylized facts documented in section 3 can also be the result
of changes in the labour market, internal migration, and other forces affecting demand and supply
in housing markets. I investigate several of these alternative explanations empirically and describe
the main results of those analyses here. Outputs from of these exercises can be found in Appendix
A.
First, I consider internal migration (within and between regions) as an alternative source of
changes in composition. Housing transactions may be driven by geographical moves between or
within a region, which may be horizonal (space) rather than vertical (quality). These moves were
surely affected by the 2008 shock to labour markets which led to a generalized drop in internal
migration.32 Less moves between districts with lower prices could generate heterogeneous changes
in volume across qualities. To test whether this was the case, I use origin-destination data on moves
32This type of transitions have sometimes been emphasized by the literature about the interaction between housing and
labour markets (see Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2012), Rupert and Wasmer (2012), Nenov (2015) and the references therein).
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at the district level from the ONS. I find no evidence that the reduction of between-district moves in
2008/2009 was concentrated in cheaper districts. In fact, these results suggest that internal moves
fell more between relatively high-quality areas.
A change in composition could be induced by a change in prices, coupled with either nominal
loss aversion or the increase in households underwater (i.e. with negative housing equity). I provide
evidence that these are unlikely to explain away the stylized fact for housing volumes. Because the
2007 drop in housing prices was preceded by a long expansion, most of the households affected by
these constraints had purchased between 2005 and 2007.33 In Figure A6 of Appendix A, I show that
excluding from the sample houses sold in this period does not remove the heterogeneous change in
transaction volumes.
Finally, I analyse the potential impact of changes in unemployment and youth unemployment
on the composition of sales. For this purpose, I exploit variation induced by a shift-share type
instrument. While my instrumental variable estimates do confirm an effect of unemployment on
transaction volumes, they do not support the hypothesis that unemployment shocks explain the
composition of sales. Results and a description of this exercise are provided in the appendix. In-
creases in unemployment appear to disproportionately reduce transactions at the upper end of the
market, so cannot explain a reduction in volumes at the other end.
These results are informative, but do not constitute a complete study of either of these mecha-
nisms, which continue to be interesting objects for further analysis. Yet the tests referred to above do
suggest that none of these drivers played an important role in explaining the stylized facts reported
in this paper.
33The trough reached by price indices in 2009 had been previously crossed by the price series in 2005.
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8. Conclusions
This paper presents evidence on the change in the composition of traded dwellings which oc-
curred during the 2008/2009 downturn in the UK housing market. Using different methods to
identify housing types, I arrive at the same conclusion: the fraction of transactions corresponding to
cheaper housing units decreased markedly during the crisis, breaking a pattern of relative stability
which had endured during the boom. I show that the large change in maximum Loan-to-Value ra-
tios offered by British banks is a likely explanation for this change in composition. I link these two
facts using a theoretical framework in which tighter credit constraints imply that younger, poorer
households are priced out of the ownership market by richer households which retain their starter
homes when trading up. The framework’s predictions are consistent with recent observed changes
in the rental market and changes in transactions by age of neighbourhood residents.
These results are novel in several aspects. In the first place, they show that the distribution
of transactions may change over the housing cycle and provide a new stylized fact that could be
used in other attempts to model how different market segments perform over time. Secondly, I
provide a rationale for these changes in composition by incorporating changes in rental supply into
the analysis. Finally, the empirical analysis confirms that deposit requirements can affect housing
tenure. In this regard, my model suggests that initiatives seeking to reduce deposit requirements can
be effective in increasing home-ownership rates. While the analysis here does not take into account
the cost associated to these policies, it clarifies the mechanism through which credit conditions can
simultaneously affect the ability of young households to get on the housing ladder and the supply
of units for rent.
This paper opens several directions for further research. First, the change in the composition
of transactions may be a general feature of housing cycles (such as the price-volume correlation)
or something exclusive of the recent British experience. Understanding whether this is the case
can help to provide a new fact around which to construct our housing models and motivate the
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standard composition adjustments that have characterized the construction of house price indices
for decades. Secondly, other factors such as income shocks or changes in expectations could also
affect the composition of sales. While some of these elements are discussed in section 7, they may
warrant specific analyses of their own. Finally, ladder models such as the one presented here may be
used to answer questions about housing affordability for the young, an ongoing problem in several
cities that is increasingly attracting the attention of policy-makers and academics.
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A. Additional Tables & Figures
This appendix includes several complementary tables and figures, all of which are mentioned
in the article. I provide brief descriptions here to complement the discussion in the main text.
Table A1 provides the number of observations available in the full Land Registry Dataset over
the 1995-2013 period and the number of observations removed after each subsequent sample re-
striction. The final row corresponds to the repeat-sales count which is built starting from the Final
Sample and removing properties that are only recorded once (matches between subsequent sales
based on addresses).
Table A1: Sample Restrictions
Observations % of Full Sample
Full Sample 18,744,353 100%
Leaseholds 4,301,626 22.9%
Newbuilds 1,904,779 10.2%
Missing Postcodes 18.640 0.1%
Final Sample 12,537,180 66.8%
Repeat-Sales Sample 9,342,390 49.8%
Note: Detailed account of sample restrictions for the Land Registry dataset.
Figure A1 represents the evolution of the number of listings and time on the market from the
second half of 2007 up to 2010. Data corresponds to the six largest English cities (London, Birming-
ham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Sheffield). Data was obtained from www.home.co.uk,
a property search website where real estate agents post listings. We observe a sharp decline in list-
ings, coupled with an increase in time on the market during the same period. The change in listings
lags the decline in transactions reported in Figure 2 by about six months.
Figure A2 shows segmentation by tenure in the housing market. I first obtain estimates of hous-
ing quality by estimating a hedonic model in which the log of reported housing values is regressed
on a set of year effects, a set of region effects and a set of housing characteristics (number of bed-
rooms, number of bathrooms, number of living rooms, building age and a dummy taking value 1 for
flats). Fitted values from this hedonic model are my quality measure. Figure A2 displays histograms
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Figure A1: Listings & Time on the market
Horizontal axis represents time at the monthly frequency. The solid line represents the evolution of listings
in the six largest English cities (left vertical axis). The dashed line represents average time on the market for
these six cities, weighted by number of listings per city (right vertical axis).
for these quality measure for rented (solid line) and owner-occupied (dashed line) dwellings. We
observe that the distribution of quality for rented dwellings is to the left of the distribution of quality
for owner occupied dwellings. Unreported regression results show that this market segmentation
increased as the crisis unfolded.
Figure A3 plots the frequency of yearly transactions for each postcode sector - dwelling type
group relative to the benchmark (1995-2007) period in the vertical axis against the within city
quality rank in the horizontal axis (as calculated in Section 3). Figures correspond to years 1997,
2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012, as shown. Figures are normalized so that the average over ranks
is equal to one. A horizontal distribution indicates that the relative frequency of transactions across
ranks was close to the average in the pre-crisis period. We can see this is the case in 1997, 2000,
2003 and 2006. However, after 2009 we observe a clearly upward sloping graph. This indicates
that transactions at the upper end of the market became relatively more frequent after the housing
bust.
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Figure A2: Housing Quality and Tenure
Histograms of housing quality for rented dwellings (solid line) and owner occupied dwellings (dashed line).
Quality obtained as fitted values from a hedonic model (see text). Data obtained from the English Housing
Survey for the period 2004-2011.
Figure A4 shows evidence that the assumption of fixed quality of a unit over time is reasonable
in this context. Quality is defined above as a fixed attribute of a house. However, it is clear that the
price a house may seek in the market at different times may differ substantially. In order to evaluate
whether my assumption is plausible, I compute quality estimates for the same units at different time
periods. I estimate quality for Postcode Sector-Dwelling type pairs for three time periods: 1998-
2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012, using location-type groups. Next I construct diagrams comparing
quality estimates in these periods. Results are presented in Figure A4. They show the rank corre-
lation plots for estimated qualities computed over 2003-2007 and 1998-2002 (top-left), 2008-2012
and 2003-2007 (top-right), and 2008-2012 and 1998-2002 (bottom). In all cases the estimated cor-
relation is larger than 0.9. This indicates that qualities estimated using this method are stable and
that the assumption of fixed quality is reasonable for the period under consideration.
In Figure A5, I document the stylized fact for the change in volumes and prices by considering a
much simpler definition of quality: dwelling type. Detached and Terraced units combined amounted
to over 65% of all transacted dwellings since 2000. These types had, respectively, the highest
and lowest average prices in England and Wales. I consider these two groups of properties and
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Figure A3: Yearly Composition Relative to 1995-2007 Period
(a) 1997 (b) 2000
(c) 2003 (d) 2006
(e) 2009 (f) 2012
Variable in the Vertical axis represents the fraction of transactions in the specified year relative to the aver-
age yearly number of transactions in 1995-2007. Horizontal axis represents the within-TTWA quality rank
calculated using postcode sector-dwelling type groups as shown in Section 3. The figure plots the contour
plot of an Normal kernel density estimate with bandwidth chosen according to Silverman’s rule-of-thumb. A
horizontal plot corresponds to a year in which the average transactions across qualities was similar to the one
in the benchmark 1995-2007 period. An upward sloping plot corresponds to years in which transactions at
the high end of the market were relatively more frequent.
track the evolution of their share of total sale volumes as well as their prices, after a seasonal
adjustment. Results are presented in Figure A5. In the left panel we can see terraced house prices
fell by 15.1% between late 2007 and mid 2009. The price drop for detached housing was slightly
lower (13.6%). Regarding transactions (right panel), the fraction of sales corresponding to each
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Figure A4: Quality Rank Correlations
Postcode Sector - Dwelling Type Pairs
Rank correlation plots of the quality estimates for periods (1998-2002), (2003-2007) and (2008-2012). Qualities esti-
mated estimated at the level of PS-DT pairs. Top-Left: Rank correlation plot for quality estimated in (2003-2007) and
(1998-2002). Top-Right: Rank correlation plot for quality estimated in (2008-2012) and (2003-2007). Bottom: Rank
correlation plot for quality estimated in (2008-2012) and (1998-2002).
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Figure A5: Detached and Terraced Housing
Left: Evolution of prices for detached and Terraced houses. Normalized to 100 at Q1 2008. Price indices constructed
using repeat-sales methodology. Right: Fraction of total transactions corresponding to detached and terraced houses.
type changed abruptly during 2008. Detached houses increased their share of total sales by four
percentage points, roughly the decrease in the fraction corresponding to terraced dwellings.
The dataset used to show the stylized facts in section 3, did not use data from new builds or
leasehold transactions. Figure A6 is analogous to the plot presented in the bottom panel of Figure 4
in the main text but includes data for these two types of transactions. As we can see, the qualitative
picture is the same: average yearly transactions after 2008 fell more for relatively lower quality
housing.
Figures A7 and A8 illustrate the representativeness of the Nationwide data in terms of both
transaction volumes and, importantly, the evolution of Loan-to-Value ratios. Firstly, Figure A7
shows the correlation between the transaction volume figures in both the Land Registry and the Na-
tionwide datasets for different geographies. The left panel shows the correlations when transactions
are aggregated up to English and Welsh districts. The correlation is visibly very high, exceeding
0.9. At a more disaggregated level, the correlation is somewhat lower but still comfortably above
0.5. Hence, in terms of coverage, the lender’s data is reasonable representative of total volumes,
particularly when looking at moderately aggregated figures. Note that the Nationwide data is used
to compute average LTV ratios at the city (TTWA) level. Secondly, Figure A8 (extracted from Ku-
vshinov (2010)) is analogous to Figure 7 in the main text, but extracted from data on total lending
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Figure A6: Including Newbuilds and Leaseholds
Postcode Sector - Dwelling Type Pairs
Plot of the change in yearly transactions between 2007 and 2009 against
the within-TTWA quality rank. Leaseholds and newbuilds included in
the calculation of transaction volumes. The cross-sectional unit is the
postcode sector-dwelling type pair. The figure plots the contour plot of
an Normal kernel density estimate taken over the resulting scatter plot,
with bandwidth chosen according to Silverman’s rule-of-thumb.
from the Council of Mortgage Lenders. The resemblance between the two figures is striking.34.
This illustrates the fact that the Nationwide data is successful in capturing the general changes in
LTV distributions over this period.
Figure A9 is provided as evidence that the reduction in LTVs that took place in 2008 was
largely supply-driven. The figure represents a weighted measure of banks responses regarding the
evolution of different relevant variables including availability of credit in panel I, maximum LTV
ratios in panel II, scoring criteria for borrowers in panel III, the fraction of approved mortgage
applications in panel IV, the availability of credit by LTV ratio in panel V, and changes in maximum
required loan-to-income ratios in figure IV. From these we can conclude that there was a substantial
tightening of credit conditions between late 2008 and early 2009. Note that this circumstance was
not undone in the subsequent periods as changes oscillated around 0 between late 2009 and 2011. In
addition, we see in panels II and V that this tightening was mainly channelled through a reduction in
34The fact that the left panel in Figure A8 does not have mass points in certain values is a consequence of its being
constructed with relatively aggregated data from the CML source
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Figure A7: Transaction Volumes in Land Registry and Nationwide Datasets
Left-panel: Represents transaction volumes in 2007 and 2009 by district in the Land Registry (vertical axis)
and the Nationwide datasets (horizontal axis). Line corresponds to fitted values from a univariate regression.
Raw correlation is 0.93 (0.92 in 2007 and 0.94 in 2009). Right-panel: Represents transaction volumes in
2007 and 2009 by Lower Super Output Areas in the Land Registry (vertical axis) and the Nationwide datasets
(horizontal axis). Line corresponds to fitted values from a univariate regression. Represented data restricted
to LSOAs with less than 500 transactions in a year (8 LSOA-year pairs excluded as outliers). Raw correlation
for full sample is 0.58.
Figure A8: LTVs Median and Distribution (CML)
Left: Vertical axis plots the median Loan-to-Value ratio on mortgages granted to first-time buyers in percent-
age and the horizontal axis plots years. Graph extracted from Kuvshinov (2010). Original data from Council
of Mortgage Lenders (CML). Right: Cumulative distributions of LTVs for First Time Buyers for years 2005,
2007, 2008 and 2009. (Source: CML).
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maximum LTV ratios and the availability of high LTV lending. Interestingly, panel VI shows there
was no substantial change in maximum loan-to-income ratios. Observed changes in bank fees and
the evolution of LIBOR rates over this period (not reported) indicate that other lending constraints
did not change during this period. In sum, these results show that i) there was a substantial, supply-
driven tightening of credit conditions between 2008 and 2009; and ii) that this tightening was largely
expressed via a reduction in the availability of high LTV mortgages.
Figure A9: Changes in Lending Conditions - Credit Conditions Survey
Panels I through VI constructed using the Bank Of England’s Credit Condition Survey. Each corresponds to one survey
question. Vertical axis represents positive/negative responses for each question, normalized to take values between
100 and -100. Horizontal axis represents time (quarterly frequency). The question in panel I asks for changes in the
availability of credit in the three months prior to the time of the survey for each quarter (positive values indicating
increase in credit). The question in panel II asks for changes in maximum LTV ratios. The question in panel III asks for
changes in the stringency of credit scoring criteria (negative indicating tighter lending criteria). The question in panel IV
asks for changes in the fraction of approved loan applications. The question in panel V asks for changes in secured credit
availability by LTV with solid lines indicating low LTVs (under 75%) and dashed lines indicating high LTVs (over 75%),
with data starting in Q3 2008. Finally, the question in panel IV asks for changes in maximum loan-to-income ratios.
Table A2 presents descriptive statistics for the city level variables used in Section 4. Credit
conditions are measured using mean Loan-to-Value ratios to First-time buyers in 2007 and 2009.
Changing labour market conditions are measured using the change in unemployment, employment
and inactivity rates as well as mean and median wages as recorded in the Labour Force Survey
59
Table A2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LTV (2007) 76.074 7.266 33.333 88.635 186
LTV (2009) 68.595 7.15 17.694 85 186
D. Unemp 1.512 1.817 -5.225 7.107 186
D. Employ -0.793 3.546 -12.9 9.875 186
D. Inactive -0.358 3.203 -9.1 12.65 186
D. SelfEmp -0.1 2.691 -8.125 10.125 186
D. Seekers 0.979 0.342 0.273 1.953 186
D. Prof. Emp 0.041 3.085 -14.45 13.2 185
D. High Edu Emp 0.709 4.916 -23.3 15.7 186
D. Mean Wage 31.61 43.809 -253.1 305.5 186
D. Median Wage 25.999 27.312 -178.6 90.100 186
Note: Descriptive statistics for the city level variables. Variables LTV (2007) and LTV (2009) are average LTVs to
First-time Buyers taken across TTWAs. The other variables are, respectively, the change in unemployment, employment
and activity rates, the change in the fraction of self-employed workers, in the fraction of benefit seekers, in the fraction
of employment in professional and high education sectors, in the mean wage, and in the median wage.
(LFS), and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. I also include the change in the fraction of
population receiving job-seeker’s allowance, the change in the fraction of population who is self-
employed, in the fraction of workers in professional sectors, and in the fraction of workers with
higher education, also obtained from the LFS. We can see that the average LTV to first time buy-
ers was substantially lower in 2009 than in 2007. Between 2007 and 2009 unemployment rates
increased on average 1.5 percentage points (mean taken across cities) and, conversely, the employ-
ment rate fell around 0.8%. TTWA populations in 2007 ranged between roughly 9000 inhabitants
in Hawes & Leyburn and over 8.5 million in London. When handling the data before estimation,
I identified two outliers in mean LTVs, observations which are more than two standard deviations
below the first percentile of the LTV distribution each year. These are the minima indicated in the
first two rows of Table A2 and correspond to the TTWAS of Brecon in 2007 and Pwllheli in 2009,
both with populations under 30,000. Results are qualitatively robust to keeping these observations
in place but in all reported estimates I have replaced these values of LTVs with the first percentile
of the respective yearly distributions (50.9% and 41.3%, respectively).
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Table A3 provides estimates for a modified specification of equation 1 which includes inter-
action terms between our Quality measure and each of the controls. Estimation is carried out via
two-step least squares with the instruments being ltv2007 in the first column 1 and ltv1999 in the sec-
ond column. P-values of joint significance tests for the coefficients of the interaction terms provided
in the table foot. See Section 4 in the main text for interpretation of these results.
Table A3: Interactions
IV
∆ LTV × Quality -0.0155*** -0.0508***
(0.00) (0.02)
∆ LTV 0.0122** -0.0103
(0.00) (0.03)
∆ Unemp. × Quality -0.00195 -0.0153
(0.01) (0.03)
∆ Emp. × Quality -0.00184 -0.0120
(0.01) (0.03)
∆ Inactive × Quality -0.000172 -0.0123
(0.01) (0.03)
∆ Self.Empl. × Quality -0.00146 0.00383
(0.01) (0.01)
∆ Job Seekers × Quality 1.925** 1.010
(0.97) (1.06)
∆ Prof.Empl. × Quality -0.000739 -0.00234
(0.01) (0.01)
∆ Mean Wage × Quality -0.0000532 0.000387
(0.00) (0.00)
∆ Youth Unemp × Quality 0.00143 0.00131
(0.00) (0.00)
Joint Sig. P-value .42 .67
R2 0.13 0.09
Observations 33572 33555
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in transactions in all specifications. IV estimation of equation 1 in the main text,
including interaction terms of all controls with the Quality variable. Joint significance test p-values for these interactions’
coefficients reported in the table footer. Columns 1 and 2 estimated with each of my instruments.
Figure A10 presents relevant descriptive information on the evolution of rental markets between
the the early 2000s and 2012. The left-panel represents the fraction of English households living
as renters obtained from the EHS. The right-panel represents the numbers of buy-to-let mortgages
provided by British banks according to the CML.
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Figure A10: Rental Market
Left: Percentage of units occupied through private rental. Vertical line corresponds to 2008. Source: English Housing
Survey. Right: Number of buy-to-let loans (in thousands) distributed to UK households over the 2003-2012 period.
Source: CML.
Tables A4 and A6 display partial correlations between the change in transactions taken over the
2007-2009 period and the change in renting (2001-2011) and average adult age, respectively. These
estimates highlight the robustness of the correlations documented in Figures 11 and 12.
Table A4: Change in Renting and the Fall in Transactions
∆ log(trans)
∆ Fract. Renters -1.600*** -1.202*** -0.936*** -0.680***
(0.102) (0.308) (0.290) (0.160)
Quality 0.174*** 0.129*** 0.174***
(0.030) (0.022) (0.008)
Controls No No Yes Yes
TTWA Effects No No No Yes
R2 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.20
Observations 33573 33573 33572 33572
Notes: LSOA (census area) level regressions. In all columns the dependent variable is the log difference
in housing transactions taken between 2007 and 2009. Changes in the fraction of renters, included as re-
gressor in all columns, taken between census (2001-2011). List of control variables as detailed in section
4. Standard errors clustered at the TTWA (city level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
I can use individual dwelling data on unit characteristics and housing tenure to verify that the
quality composition of rental stock changed during and after 2008. I first obtain quality estimates
as fitted values of a regression of property values on housing characteristics.35 I use this quality
measure to estimate:
35For this purpose I use self-assessed property values, as reported in the EHS from 2008 under variable valout.
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rentedi = β1Q̂uality + β2Q̂uality × Crisist + δt + ηr + ǫi
where rentedi is a dummy taking value 1 for rented units, Q̂uality are fitted values from the
hedonic regression, and δt and ηt are time and region effects, respectively. Estimates for parameters
β1 and β2 are provided in column 3 of Table A5. We observe that both β1 and β2 are negative. This
implies that low quality properties are more likely to be rented throughout the whole period, but that
this bias increases after 2008. In column 4, I include a full set of interactions between Q̂uality and
year dummies. We can see that, throughout the period, quality has a negative correlation with the
probability of renting, but this slope is stable between 2004 and 2007 and increases in 2008. This
shows that after 2007 renting increased more at the lower end of the market, which is consistent
with the model assumptions and the mechanisms emphasized there.
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Table A5: Change in the Composition of the Rented Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rented House Rented House Rented House Rented House
House Quality -0.0708*** -0.177*** -0.165***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
House Quality × Post 2008 -0.0145*
(0.01)
House Quality × Year2004 -0.133***
(0.01)
House Quality × Year2005 -0.126***
(0.01)
House Quality × Year2006 -0.136***
(0.01)
House Quality × Year2007 -0.130***
(0.01)
House Quality × Year2008 -0.165***
(0.01)
House Quality × Year2009 -0.171***
(0.01)
House Quality × Year2010 -0.180***
(0.01)
House Quality × Year2011 -0.186***
(0.01)
Region FE N Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y
R2 0.00797 0.0377 0.0378 0.0378
Observations 139020 139020 139020 139020
Note: Dwelling-level regressions using data from the English Housing Survey (repeated cross-
sections), between 2004 and 2011. Dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 for rented
units. Quality measured in log price points and obtained as fitted values from a hedonic re-
gression of housing valuations on size measures, built year and a set of region effects. Survey
weights used in all specifications. Regional and time effects included in columns 2, 3 and 4.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A6: Mean Age and the Fall in Transactions
∆ log(trans)
Age 0.0255*** 0.0220*** 0.0187*** 0.0122***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quality 0.173*** 0.134*** 0.166***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls No No Yes Yes
TTWA Effects No No No Yes
R2 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.21
Observations 32789 32789 32788 32788
Notes: LSOA (census area) level regressions. In all columns the dependent variable is the log difference
in housing transactions taken between 2007 and 2009. Average adult age (over 25) in 2007, included as
regressor in all columns. List of control variables as detailed in section 4. Standard errors clustered at the
TTWA (city) level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B. Appendix - Theoretical Framework
In this Appendix I provide derivations and proofs for the Model presented in section 5. These
are organized as follows:
1. Recursive Equilibrium Definition.
2. Indirect Utilities in Steady State.
3. Steady State Price Bounds.
4. Parameter Restrictions and SS Allocations.
5. Proofs of Proposition 1.
6. Sensitivity Analysis of Transitions.
B.1. Recursive Equilibrium Definition
The recursive competitive equilibrium consists of a set of states of the economy X (see state
variables below), a set of decision rules for housing purchases, tenure choice and renting out de-
cisions (see choice variables and constraints), value functions (see decision rules), property price
functions (PL(x), pH(x), R(x)) mapping the state of the economy to the real line, and a law of mo-
tion for the state of the economy. Conditions for these objects to configure a recursive competitive
equilibrium are provided below.
B.1.1. State Variables
The state of the economy at the beginning of every period is given by:
x = (h(i, 2), h(i, 3), b(i, 2), b(i, 3))
where functions h(i, 2) and h(i, 3) map agent types i to their property holdings (of L and H units)
at the beginning of ages 2 and 3, respectively. Function b(i, 2) and b(i, 3) record non-housing assets
for agent of type i at the beginning of ages 2 and 3, respectively.
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h(i, a) = (hL(i, a), hH(i, a))
′
with
hL(i, 2), hL(i, 3) : [0, 1] → N
+
b(i, 2), b(i, 3) : [0, 1] → R
B.1.2. Choice Variables
In every period agents decisions determine housing assets for the beginning of the next period
h′(i, x, a), next period assets b′(i, x, a), tenure choice τ ′(i, x, a) and the decision to rent out property
λ′(i, x, a), all of which are defined for a = {1, 2}.
B.1.3. Constraints
There are three constraints on agents’ decisions. Budget constraints, credit constraints and
constraints associated to housing tenure decisions. The first constraint determines the law of motion
of non-housing assets. Credit constraints determine the set of feasible housing asset combinations.
Housing tenure decisions determine feasible values of τ ′(i, x, a).
Budget constraint (law of motion of non-housing assets) for a = {1, 2}36
b′(i, b, h, h′, x, a) = (1+r)
(
ea(i)(1 – 1{τ
′(i, a) = 0}) + b(i, a) – c – Pown(h′(i, x, a) – h(i, a)) + R(λ′(i, x, a) – τ ′R(i, x, a))
)
Credit Constraints (Mortgage on only one unit) for a = {1, 2}
Γ(i, b, h, h′, x, a) = {h′ ∈ N2 : ea(i)+b+P
ownh(i, x, a) ≥ γ(max{PL(x)1{h
′
L > 0}, pH(x)1{h
′
H > 0}})}
Tenure Constraints (can only owner occupy if you own) for a = {1, 2}
τ ′L(i, x, a) ∈ {1, 0} if h
′
L(i, x, a) ≥ 1
τ ′L(i, x, a) = 0 if h
′
L(i, x, a) = 0
τ ′H(i, x, a) ∈ {1, 0} if h
′
H(i, x, a) ≥ 1
τ ′H(i, x, a) = 0 if h
′
H(i, x, a) = 0
36Recall Pown = (PL, pH).
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B.1.4. Value Functions and Decision Rules
Policy functions labelled as fh for housing assets and fτ for housing tenure and fλ for decisions
to rent out property. Decision on non-housing assets follows from law of motion of wealth. I define
these and the value functions here.
Housing Assets
fh(i, x, 1) solves v1(i, x) = max
h′∈Γ(i,0,0,h′,1)
v2(i, b
′(i, 0, 0, h′, 1), h′, x′)
fh(i, x, 2) solves v2(i, x) = max
h′∈Γ(i,b,h,h′,x,2)
uh(τ (i, 2)) + βv3(i, b
′(i, b, h, h′, 2), h′, x′)
fh(i, x, 3) solves v3(i, x) = max
h′∈Γ(i,b,h,h′,x,3)
uh(τ (i, 3)) + b + P
own(h – h′) – b′(i, b, h, h′, x)
Note that v3(i, x) includes h
′ and b′ entering with a negative sign. Arguments for functions
h(i, a) and b(i, a) omitted for brevity.
Landlord




h′L(i, x, a) – τ
′
L(i, x, a) + h
′
H(i, x, a) – τ
′
H(i, x, a) if R(x) ≥ 0
0 Otherwise
Housing Tenure
For sufficiently large vL, vH and vH – vL
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(0, 0, 1) if hH(i, x, a) ≥ 1
(0, 1, 0) if hL(i, x, a) ≥ 1 & hH(i, x, a) = 0
(1, 0, 0) if b + ea(i) > R(x) & hH(i, x, a) = 0 & hL(i, x, a) = 0
B.1.5. Housing Market Clearing
∫
h′(i, x, 2) + h′(i, x, 3)d i = (SL, SH)
′
∫
λ′(i, x, 2) + λ′(i, x, 3)d i =
∫
τ ′R(i, x, 2) + τ
′
R(i, x, 3)d i
B.1.6. Law of Motion
Because both the housing tenure and the decision to become a landlord are determined solely
by housing market decisions, the law of motion of this economy is given by:
b(i, 2) = b′(i, 0, 0, fh(i, x, 1), 1)
b(i, 3) = b′(i, b(i, 2), h(i, 2), fh(i, x, 2), 1)
h(i, 2) = fh(i, x, 1)
h(i, 3) = fh(i, x, 2)
B.2. Indirect Utilities in Steady State
Given my assumption on the discount rate (namely, that β(1 + r) ≥ 1) we can assume without
loss of generality that agents will delay all consumption to age 3. In steady state, all prices faced by
agents are the same in periods 1, 2 and 3 of their lifetimes. It is straightforward to solve for utility
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as a function of e2(i), e(i) and e3(i) for each lifetime path of tenure choices (e.g.: rent as young and
buy high as old, buy low as young and invest in a low house when old, etc.).
Indirect utilities for each path of lifetime tenure choices are the following:37
V∅,∅ = β2[e3(i)]
V∅,R = β2[e2(i)(1 + r) + e3(i) – (1 + r)R] + β
2µvL
VR,R = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i) – R((1 + r) + (1 + r)
2)] + β2µvL + βµvL
VR,L = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i) – R(1 + r)
2 – rpL] + βvL + β
2µvL
VL,L = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i) – (r
2 + 2r)pL] + βvL + β
2vL
VR,H = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i) – R(1 + r)
2 – rpH] + βµvL + β
2vH
VL,H = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i) – (r
2 + r)pL – rpH] + βvL + β
2vH
VL,HL = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i) – (r
2 + r)pL + (1 + r)R – rpH] + βvL + β
2vH
Steady state prices pL and pH are necessarily smaller than e(1)/(1 – γ) (the maximum wealth an
old agent in this economy can have, scaled by the down-payment requirement). Other price bounds
are provided in the main text. Therefore, by assumption 3.1 on preference parameters, owner oc-
cupation is always worth its user cost. Rents R are pinned down by the income distribution, so that
R = e1(2 – SL – SH) if rental markets exist (see expression 5.3 in the main text). Using assumptions
3.1 to 3.4 on preference parameters, in combination with these price bounds and operating with the
expressions for indirect utilities we can conclude that:
VL,HL > VH,L > VL,L > VR,H > VR,L > VR,R > V∅,R > V∅,∅
B.3. Steady State Price Bounds
B.3.1. Proof (PH Upper bound)
I prove here that pH ≤ e(1 – SH)(1 – γ)
–1, expression 5.1 in the text.
37Super-indices indicate lifetime transitions. E.g. V∅,R corresponds to indirect utility for agents living in social housing
(or with parents) at the beginning of period 2 and renting at the beginning of period 3. Naturally, other transitions are
possible, yet under the assumptions invoked here, they will never arise in equilibrium.
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Assuming pH > e(1 – SH)(1 – γ)
–1 → Down-payment necessary to buy an H type unit is
(1 – γ)pH > e(1 – SH). Therefore, only a mass of agents smaller than SH would be able to afford
this down-payment, (note that assumption 4.2 ensures old agents with i = 1 – SH have more wealth
than all young agents in SS). As a result, markets would not clear, so pH ≤ e(1 – SH)(1 – γ)
–1.
B.3.2. Proof (PL Lower bound)
I prove here that in SS, pL ≥ e1(2 – SL – SH) (1 – γ)
–1, expression 5.2 in the text.
Proceed by contradiction. So suppose PL < e1(2 – SL – SH) (1 –γ)
–1 → required down-payment
pL(1–γ) < e1(2–SL–SH) → mass of age 1 agents who can buy a type L unit is m
1
L > 1–(2–SL–SH) =
SL + SH – 1.
Under the counter-factual assumption and given 4.1, all age 2 agents would be to buy a type
L unit → m2L = 1. Hence we have that the total mass of agents able to buy L type units would be
m1L + m
2
L > SL + SH (note the strict inequality).
Up to a mass SH of these agents buy an H unit instead. This leaves us with the contradictory
statement that a mass of agents larger than SL would reside in L units for these SS prices. This
cannot be the case in equilibrium so PL ≥ e1(2 – SL – SH) (1 – γ)
–1.
B.3.3. Proof (R = e1(2 – SL – SH))
I prove here that, if rental markets exist, R = e1(2 – SL – SH), expression 5.3 in the text. We
again proceed by contradiction.
Assume R < e1(2 – SL – SH). Under this condition and given assumption 3.2, households who
are unable to owner-occupy would be willing to to rent. Total mass of agents who could then afford
a rent would be larger than 2 – SL – SH in age 1, and 1 in age 2. This would again break market
clearing conditions (excess demand), so in equilibrium R ≥ e1(2 – SL – SH).
If R > e1(2 – SL – SH) and rental markets do exist, then a mass of more than 2 – SL – SH young
agents would remain homeless at the end of each period. This implies housing markets do not clear
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(excess supply of housing units) and R ≤ e1(2 – SL – SH).
So, if rental markets exist, R = e1(2 – SL – SH).
Note that in the absence of rental markets we can follow a similar analysis to show that in
equilibrium we would need PL = e1(2 – SL – SH)(1 – γ)
–1.
B.3.4. Existence of rental Markets
I prove here that under assumptions 3.1 to 4.5, rental markets exist in steady state. A participa-
tion and an incentive constraint need to be satisfied for this purpose: Some households have to be
able to own two units, and there have to be incentives to become a landlord.
Assumption 4.3, combined with the price bound for pH , ensures that at least a mass 1 – SH of
old agents can simultaneously own an L and an H property and rent it out.
There will be incentives to be a landlord if and only if R > r PL.
38 This is ensured by combining
an upper bound on L prices (e1(1) (1 – γ)
–1) with bound 5.3. Hence, 3.5 ensures that there are
incentives to become a landlord.
B.4. Parameter Restrictions and SS Allocations
Here I provide the proof regarding the class of steady state allocations feasible under assump-
tions 3.1 to 4.5. These are included in the text as conditions on the relative sizes of i thresholds
given in 6 (see main text).
38Note that only low type units would be available for rent in equilibrium. This is a consequence of the fact that all



























HL < 1 (14)




H , etc.) and then
proceed to prove the inequalities above one by one. Finally, I provide the final expressions for the
thresholds for old agents.
Expressions for Rental and Ownership Thresholds - Young Agents




















1 (pH(1 – γ) + pL) (15.4)






L < 1 < i
y
H
Condition 10 follows from the relation on prices R < (1 – γ)pL < (1 – γ)pH . Note in addition
that given assumption 4.1 and bound 5.3, we will also have that ioR < 0, meaning that all old agents
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can afford to rent.
It remains to show that 1 < i
y
H . This follows from assumption 4.2, indicating that e1(1) <
e(1 – SH) – e1(2 – SL – SH). Richest young agents (those with i = 1), have less resources that a mass
SH of old agents. Note that young agents will be priced out of high quality ownership by some old
agents even if the latter rented when young.
Proof (ioh < i
y
h
for h = {L, H})




L (proof of the same
condition for H units is very similar).
Note that i
y




L, then marginal old buyers
of L units bought L when young and therefore:
e(ioL) = e1(i
o
L)(1 + r) + e2(i
o
L) = (1 – γ)pL + rpL
e1(i
o
L) > (1 – γ)pL
e2(i
o
L) > (1 – γ)pL > rpL
The first equality and the second and third inequalities cannot be true simultaneously (recall
r < 1 – γ). Therefore ioL > i
y




L. Proceed analogously to rule out the
case of equality. Therefore, ioL < i
y
L.
Proof: ioH < i
y
L
This condition means marginal H owner occupiers when old were renters in period 1. This
is ensured by assumption 4.2, which implies that a mass of SH old agents can become landlords,
pricing out young agents with i = 1 – SH . This means that old agents with i = SH have enough
wealth to buy both an H property, and an L property with pL = e1(1 – SH)/(1 – γ). Therefore,
e(SH) > pH(1 – γ) + e1(1 – SH)/(1 – γ)
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which is true given upper bound 5.2 for pH and assumption 4.2.





Condition 11 is true given price ordering R < pL < pH and what we know about period one
choices from condition 13.
Consider statement ioL < i
o




L. Given that no young agents own H
units, we also know ioH = 1 – SH . Given that SL > 1, no old agents were homeless or social renters
when young. Hence, ioH = e







e–1(pL(1 – γ) + R(1 + r)) if rented when young
e–12 (pL(1 – γ)) if social housing/living with parents when young
Because e–1(.) is strictly increasing, we know ioL < i
o
H if households with i = i
o
L rented when
young. If these agents were in social housing or living with parents when young, then ioL < i
o
H
because old agents were renters (and young renters have higher incomes).
Statement ioR < i
o






The final condition 14 relates to the lifetime transitions of landlords. The fact that marginal





for proposition 1 because this ensures some key households experience a transition at age 2 in which
they keep their starter unit when trading up the ladder. The statement ioHL > i
y
L can be proved using
assumption 4.4.
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We proceed by contradiction. If ioHL < i
y








HL) < pL(1 – γ)
e2(i
o
HL) > pH(1 – γ) + (γ(1 + r) – 1)pL + (1 + r)R
Using the last equation combined with the bounds on prices 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, this leads to
e2(i
o
HL) > e(1 – SH) + (2 + r)e1(2 – SL – SH). Note that this cannot be the case given assumption 4.4.
The statement that ioHL < 1 follows from the proof of existence of rental markets provided in this
appendix.
Dual L Owners
A final point is due regarding the possibility of dual ownership of low type units. A household
could, in principle, own two L units in steady state, whether if they owner-occupy one and rent
another out, or because they owner-occupy an H dwelling and rent out two L units. These cases
ruled out by assumptions 4.4 and 4.5.
I first show that assumption 4.5 rules out the presence of landlords who are owner-occupiers of
L units. To see this, it suffices to show that pL(2 – γ) – R > pH(1 – γ). Price bounds 5.1 and 5.2,
imply:
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pL ≥ e1(2 – SL – SH)/(1 – γ)




e1(2 – SL – SH) > e(1 – SH) → pL(2 – γ) – R > pH(1 – γ) (16)
The statement to the left of 16, is satisfied by assumption 4.5 (replace price bounds as appropriate),
and is a sufficient (not necessary) condition ruling out households owning two L and no H dwellings.
Finally, I show that assumption 4.4 ensures no households own three dwellings in steady state
(i.e. two L and one H). This condition can be written as:
e(1) < pH(1 – γ) + pL(2 + r) – 2 ∗ R
Given price bound for H and 4.3
e(1) < e(1 – SH) +
2 + r
1 – γ
e1(1 – SH) – 2e1(2 – SL – SH)
which is true given assumption 4.4
Expressions for Rental and Ownership Thresholds - Old Agents
While conditions in (6) restrict the set of potential lifetime transitions, we still have to proceed
on a case by case basis to obtain expressions for the housing allocation thresholds for old agents. I
discuss here the case illustrated in Figure 8 in the main text. Other cases yield analogous conclusions
regarding the effects of credit tightening. With these lifetime transitions, the thresholds for old
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–1(pL(1 – γ) + R(1 + r)) (17.2)
ioH = e
–1(pH(1 – γ) + R(1 + r)) (17.3)
ioHL = e
–1(pH(1 – γ) + rpL) (17.4)
The first threshold is determined by rental affordability, the second by the ability of old agents
to afford a down-payment. Note that the second threshold also depends on rental prices because
marginal buyers of L dwellings of age 2 were renters in period 1 (see Figure 8).
B.5. Proofs of Proposition 1




higher values of SR if housing allocations can be described by 6.
Proof






. Total differentiation with respect to γ in





(1 – γ) – pH
)




(1 – γ) – pL
)
(g1(pL(1 – γ)) + g2(pL(1 – γ))) =









From equation 18 we can conclude that the sum in the first parenthesis is equal to 0. In addition,
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substituting in the second term of equation 19 and proceeding by contradiction,39 we conclude that:
∂pH
∂γ
(1 – γ) = pH (20)
∂pL
∂γ
(1 – γ) ∈ (0, pL) (21)
Conditions 20 and 21 tell us how prices change with γ, and how the type thresholds i are affected
by a tightening of credit conditions. The final step of the proof is to identify the implications of these
conditions for transaction volumes (by unit type) trL and trH , as well as determining how γ affects
the rental market. Operating from 8 and 9 we obtain:
d trH
d γ













(1 – γ) – pL
)







suffices to prove the first statement of the proposition for the SS allocation in Figure 8. The second
statement relates to the fraction of renters. Note that for this allocation we will have that SR =
1 – e–1(pH(1 – γ) + (1 + r)pL – R). Total differentiation w.r.t. γ combined with the results for the











(1 – γ) – pH
)
g(pH(1 – γ) + (1 + r)pL) < 0

B.5.1. Other Cases
The text provides a proof of Proposition 1 for a specific steady state allocation satisfying:
i
y

























K2 where K1 and K2 are
strictly positive. Condition 21 follows from this equation.
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Assumptions 3.1 to 4.5 provide constraints on the feasible steady state allocations. Within
those constraints, a steady state configuration different from 22 is possible, featuring no old renters.
Moreover, the proof can also be extended to cases beyond those permitted under the selected para-
metric assumptions. I discuss three examples of this below. The first is that of an allocation that
differs from the allocation in Figure 8 in that there are no old renters. In the second case, marginal
H buyers when old were home-owners when young. In the third case, some young households are















This case is similar to the one discussed in the text but now there are no old agents living as










1 (pL(1 – γ))
ioH = e
–1(pH(1 – γ) + (1 + r)R)
ioHL = e
–1(pH(1 – γ) + (1 + r)pL – R)
In this context we will have that the expressions for market clearing conditions and transaction
volumes for L units and H units are:




H + 1 – i
o
HL
SH = 1 – i
o
H




















(1 – γ) – pH
)









(1 – γ) – pH
)
where A1 = g1(pL(1 – γ), A2 = g(pH(1 – γ) + R(1 + r)) – A3, A3 = g(pH(1 – γ) + (1 + r)pL – R)
and B1 = g(pH(1 – γ) + (1 + r)R) are strictly positive and functions g(.) and g1(.) are as defined in
the proof of the baseline case. From these expressions we can proceed by contradiction to obtain:
∂pL
∂γ




(1 – γ) – pH
)
= 0
These conditions can be used to prove both statements of the proposition for this case by total
differentiation of trL, trH and S













This is the case in which young agents cannot own a high type unit and marginal old owner
occupiers of an H dwelling owner occupied an L unit when young (in opposition to the case treated
in the text, where marginal H buyers rented when young). In this context we will have that the





1 (pL(1 – γ))
ioL = e
–1(pL(1 – γ) + (1 + r)R)
ioH = e
–1(pH(1 – γ) + rpL)
ioHL = e
–1(pH(1 – γ) + (1 + r)pL – R)
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The market clearing conditions and SS transaction volumes for L units and H units are:






L + 1 – i
o
HL
SH = 1 – i
o
H
trL = 1 – i
o
L
trH = 1 – i
o
H































where A1,A2,A3 and B1 are strictly positive. Working with these expressions and proceeding by


















∈ (0, pL). Now, total differentiation of the expressions for







which proves the first statement of the proposition. Finally, total differentiation of rental supply
























This case is similar to the case discussed in the text but now a fraction of high income young
















1 (pH(1 – γ))
ioL = e
–1
2 (pL(1 – γ))
ioH = e
–1(pH(1 – γ) + (1 + r)R)
ioHL = e
–1(pH(1 – γ) + (1 + r)pL – R)
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HL)






















H = 1 – i
o
H


























(1 – γ) – pH
)










∈ (0, pL). These two results can be used to prove both statements of the
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proposition as in the cases above (total differentiate expressions for transactions and rental supply,
proceed by contradiction).
The change in steady state allocations in response to a reduction in maximum LTVs (a decrease
in γ) is illustrated in Figure B11 for this case. The economic mechanism is identical to the one
displayed in the main text. The steady state allocation of H units is unaffected by γ because changes
in SS prices offset differences in credit availability.
Figure B11: Change in Steady State for γ′ < γ


















Note: Figure displays the change in steady-state allocations resulting from a tightening of credit conditions when a
fraction of young agents are owner occupiers of H units.
B.6. Sensitivity Analysis of Transitions
This section presents parameter sensitivity tests for the transitions between steady states. Three
cases different from the one provided in the main text are considered here. The choice of parameters
for these cases are provided in Table B7. In config I, the set of parameters is consistent with
assumptions 3.1 to 4.5. Cases II and III do not satisfy these assumptions. As indicated in the text,
the parametric assumptions used in the main analysis are sufficient but not necessary conditions for
the main results in the paper. The panels in Figure B12 report transition dynamics for these different
sets of parameters. We can see that the changes in the composition of transactions and the fraction
of renters are qualitatively analogous to those reported in Figure 10 in the text for config. I and II.
The case for config. III is similar, but the transition in renting and transactions begins in the period
after the shock arrives.
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Note: Left-panel represents the time series of transaction volumes for H and L type dwellings. The
horizontal axis represents time, and the vertical axis represents number of sales. Gray line corresponds to
trH , and black lines correspond to trL. Right-panel represents the time series for the fraction of renters,
represented in the vertical axis. Parameters and income distributions for the three cases reported in Table B7.
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Table B7: Numerical Analysis: Parameter Values
Parameters vL vH µ SL SH r γi γf1 γf2
Config. I 200 280 0.5 1050 750 0.01 0.8 0.75 0.7
Config. II 200 280 0.5 1050 750 0.025 0.8 0.75 0.7
Config. III 200 280 0.5 1050 900 0.01 0.8 0.775 0.75
Income Distributions
Config. I Config. II Config. III
Period 1 U[0.6, 1.5] 0.9 × Beta[1.5, 1.5] + 0.6 4 × Beta[2, 2] + 2
Period 2 U[1, 5] 6 × Beta[1.5, 1.5] + 1 17.5 × Beta[2, 2] + 2.5
Period 3 U[1, 6] 6 × Beta[1.5, 1.5] + 1 17.5 × Beta[2, 2] + 2.5
# of Households (born in t) 1000
Note: Parameters and income distributions for numerical analysis. Parameter γi, represents initial
maximum LTV ratios, γf1 indicates final γ after a moderate reduction, and γf2 indicates final γ
after a large reduction.
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Appendix C - Data Sources
• The transactions data is made available by the Land Registry. As required by this govern-
ment body I cite: Data produced by Land Registry c©Crown copyright 2015.
• Labour market outcomes at the local authority and regional level where obtained from the
Annual Population Survey and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
• I have also used information from the Wealth and Assets Survey. Office for National Statis-
tics. Social Survey Division, Wealth and Assets Survey, Waves 1-3, 2006-2012 [computer
file]. 3rd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], October 2014.
• Information for housing tenure at the unit level has been obtained from the English Hous-
ing Survey. Department for Communities and Local Government, English Housing Survey:
Housing Stock Data. 4th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March
2013.
• Internal migration estimates were obtained fr the Office of National Statistics.
• Data from the Council of Mortgage Lenders was obtained from tabulations present in the
CML’s regular bulletins.
• Data on credit conditions during this period was obtained from the Credit Conditions Survey
published quarterly by the Bank of England.
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